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Summary Findings
Conditional Cash Transfers programs (CCTs)—which grant cash to 
poor families provided they make speciﬁ  ed investments in the human 
capital of their children—have been championed as an effective 
intervention for social protection.  Some CCTs include requirements 
(called conditionalities) related to health and nutrition.  Yet while there 
is evidence indicating that some CCTs have improved the nutritional 
status of beneﬁ  ciary children, there has been little commentary on 
the potential for CCTs to make a greater contribution to improving 
nutritional status, nor on the programmatic and contextual issues 
affecting their ability to do so.  This paper ﬁ  nds that where utilization of 
nutrition interventions is low, there is signiﬁ  cant potential for CCTs to 
play a greater role in reducing undernutrition by encouraging groups 
at high risk of undernutrition to utilize effective nutrition services 
and by encouraging improved quality of these services.  Several key 
design modiﬁ   cations—e.g. limiting CCT eligibility to the “window 
of opportunity” for nutrition impact, prioritizing nutrition-related 
conditionalities based on best practices in nutrition, increasing attention 
to supply-side investments for nutrition and health services, and 
improving coordination with other agencies and stakeholders—could 
allow CCTs to better contribute to eliminating child undernutrition in 
the developing world.  At the same time, there is much to be learned 
about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of various design options, 
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Conditional Cash Transfers programs (CCTs)—which grant cash to poor families 
provided they make specified investments in the human capital of their children—have 
been championed as an effective intervention for social protection. Some CCTs include 
requirements (called conditionalities) related to health and nutrition. Yet while there is 
evidence indicating that some CCTs have improved the nutritional status of beneficiary 
children, there has been little commentary on the potential for CCTs to make a greater 
contribution to improving nutritional status, nor on the programmatic and contextual 
issues affecting their ability to do so. This paper finds that where utilization of nutrition 
interventions is low, there is significant potential for CCTs to play a greater role in 
reducing undernutrition by encouraging groups at high risk of undernutrition to utilize 
effective nutrition services and by encouraging improved quality of these services. 
Several key design modifications—e.g. limiting CCT eligibility to the “window of 
opportunity” for nutrition impact, prioritizing nutrition-related conditionalities based on 
best practices in nutrition, increasing attention to supply-side investments for nutrition 
and health services, and improving coordination with other agencies and stakeholders—
could allow CCTs to better contribute to eliminating child undernutrition in the 
developing world. At the same time, there is much to be learned about the effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of various design options, as well as their appropriateness in 
different country contexts. 
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1. Introduction  
Undernutrition is a serious and pervasive problem, with long-term consequences for child 
development, and ultimately for adult productivity and national economic growth.
1 
Despite the existence of practical and inexpensive nutrition interventions that have 
proven effective in diverse country contexts (Allen and Gillespie 2001; World Bank 
2006a; Bhutta et al. 2008 and others), roughly 30 percent of children in the developing 
world remain malnourished, and progress in alleviating undernutrition, although 
impressive in some countries, continues to be slow overall (UNICEF 2006; World Bank 
2006a). Indeed, only 24 percent of developing countries (34 of 143) are on track to meet 
the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of halving the proportion of people 
suffering from hunger from 1990 to 2015
2 (World Bank 2006a). Additional advocacy and 
service delivery channels, as well as linkages between nutrition interventions and social 
protection initiatives may prove critical to achieving this goal. Cash transfer programs, 
both unconditional and conditional, have become increasingly popular and appear to be a 
promising vehicle for improving nutrition. 
 
Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) provide cash payments to poor households 
that meet certain behavioral requirements, generally related to children’s health care and 
education. The combination of cash and conditionality allows CCT programs to boost 
household consumption in the short-term while providing an incentive, and helping to 
offset the costs, for poor families to invest in long-term human capital development. By 
building healthier, stronger, and more productive future generations, CCTs aim to 
interrupt the intergenerational transfer of poverty. CCTs have become one of the most 
popular social protection programs in developing countries. They have been called an 
“innovative and increasingly popular channel for the delivery of social services” and one 




That CCTs promote synergies in human development through required use of education, 
health, and sometimes nutrition services gives them great potential to reduce both 
immediate and chronic poverty and, at the same time, to contribute significantly to 
improving nutritional outcomes. Still, despite some evidence of CCT impacts on 
nutritional status (reduced rates of child stunting and, in one case, anemia), some policy-
makers believe that the full potential of CCTs to improve nutritional status has not been 
met (Grosh 2007). So far health and educational outcomes have received the lion’s share 
of attention in CCT programs. To date, there has been little commentary on the potential 
                                                 
1 Over-nutrition is also a growing problem among children and adults as developing countries become 
better off, adopt more sedentary lifestyles, and consume more processed and high-fat foods. While 
beyond this scope of this paper, it is conceivable that CCTs could also play a role in addressing over-
nutrition, too. 
2 This target is assessed based on the prevalence of children under five who are underweight (UNICEF 
2006). 
3 CCTs, however, are not without critics. For example, there is concern that conditions are dangerous 
policy tools and that they are paternalistic. The title of this paper: “Superfluous, Pernicious, Atrocious 
and Abominable? The Case Against Conditional Cash Transfers” is a case in point. Lomelí 2008 also 
outlines a series of critiques. 2 
 
for CCTs to make a greater contribution to improving nutritional status, nor on the 
programmatic and contextual issues affecting their ability to do so. 
 
Some CCTs include programmatic elements that address child nutrition in the form of 
conditionalities (also called co-responsibilities), which require beneficiaries to use 
services or participate in activities that contribute to improved health and nutritional 
status. For example, some CCTs attempt to change beneficiary health and nutrition 
behaviors via group nutrition education workshops and child growth monitoring and 
promotion (sometimes accompanied by standardized or individualized counseling) and 
some attempt to boost the micronutrient status of beneficiaries via micronutrient or 
nutritional supplementation (see Box 1.1). 
 
Box 1.1. Nutrition Conditionalities Employed in CCTs 
•  Nutrition education workshops: Group learning sessions for beneficiaries (usually 
mothers) providing information about health, nutrition, and, sometimes, other 
themes (e.g. reproductive health, hygiene, community participation). 
 
•  Growth monitoring and promotion (GMP): Periodic weighing of young children 
to determine adequacy of child growth. Standardized counseling for all children 
or individualized counseling based on the results of child growth is sometimes 
provided to help mothers understand and improve their child’s growth.  
 
•  Micronutrient supplementation: The provision of essential micronutrients 
(vitamins and minerals) lacking in the diet that can contribute to improved health 
outcomes and nutritional status. Micronutrient supplements are usually provided 
to young children and pregnant and lactating women. 
 
•  Nutritional supplementation: The provision of food to supply vitamins, minerals, 
protein, and energy that is missing or not consumed in sufficient quantity in the 
diet. These are also generally provided to young children and pregnant and 
lactating women. (To date, only Mexico provides this as part of a CCT.) 
 
There is considerable evidence on the linkages between incentives and behavior change, 
both from CCTs and other incentive-based intervention programs (Medlin and de Walque 
2008). However, much of this impact has been noted for “simple” behavioral responses 
or those involving a single finite action (such as participating in required health clinic 
visits) rather than “complex” behavioral change (Kane et al. 2004 cited in Medlin and de 
Walque 2008). This paper recognizes that many critical behavior changes that lead to 
sustainable improvements in nutritional status—such as exclusive breastfeeding, 
appropriate pregnancy rest, or hand-washing after defecation—are intimate, complex, and 
difficult to change, and therefore CCTs are not set up to address these behaviors directly. 
Indeed, it is impossible to provide monetary incentives contingent on such actions 
because it is impossible to monitor them.  
 
Still, the paper contends that under the right conditions, CCTs may still be able to play a 
pivotal role in improving nutritional status by applying conditionalities to spur 
participation by groups at high risk of undernutrition in activities and services that 
contribute to better nutritional outcomes, and by improving the accessibility and quality 3 
 
of these services where supply is low and/or quality is poor. The underlying assumption 
in this paper is that CCTs can complement, rather than replace, other nutrition 
interventions and should be considered one of a menu of options that can address 
undernutrition. When CCTs are used for nutrition objectives, they should be well 
coordinated with the existing priorities guiding a country’s nutrition policy.  
 
The paper attempts to answer the following questions:  
1.  How can CCTs be better designed, coordinated, and leveraged to increase their 
impact on child undernutrition (e.g. via fostering behaviors that contribute to 
improved nutritional status and/or enhancing the supply of nutrition-related 
services and activities)?  
2.  How can best practices from nutrition interventions be applied to ensure 
maximum CCT impact on child undernutrition?  
3.  What are the key issues affecting the potential for CCTs to become an effective 
tool in nutrition policy and programming? 
 
The nutritional outcomes of interest in this paper are child stunting and anemia. Stunting 
is the best anthropometric measure of the cumulative effect of chronic nutritional 
deprivation, and therefore a good indicator of long-term wellbeing. Iron-deficiency 
anemia (IDA) is the most common nutrient deficiency worldwide and has important 
implications for cognitive development and work productivity.
4  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines undernutrition and discusses the 
magnitude of the problem, implications for long-term human capital development, and 
how and when to intervene. Section 3 describes CCT programs, including conceptual 
foundations for applying conditionalities, the position of CCTs in the current 
development paradigm, and reasons for their widespread popularity. Section 4 develops a 
rationale for using CCTs as one of a set of tools to improve nutritional status. Section 5 
compares the design, implementation, and impacts of CCTs in five Latin American 
countries (Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico). Section 6 explores how 
best practices in nutrition could inform CCT design and Section 7 introduces redesigned 
and emerging CCTs focusing on nutrition. Section 8 examines some of the key issues 
surrounding the use of CCTs for nutrition policy, including program eligibility and 
benefit duration, the use of conditionalities, supply-side investments, the cost and cost-
effectiveness of these efforts, and institutional roles and coordination. Section 9 
concludes with recommendations and suggestions for further research.  
 
2. Understanding Undernutrition 
There are several manifestations of child undernutrition including stunting (low height 
for age), underweight (low weight for age), wasting (low weight for height), and 
                                                 
4 According to the WHO 40 percent of the world’s population suffers from IDA, with women and children 
experiencing the highest prevalence because iron requirements are higher for pregnant women, adolescent 
girls, and infants and young children (Allen and Gillespie 2001). 4 
 
deficiencies in key vitamins and minerals (called micronutrients).
5 Stunting (also called 
chronic malnutrition), reflects the failure to reach linear skeletal growth potential and is 
considered the best indicator of the long-term, cumulative effects of undernutrition 
among young children. Wasting (thinness) reflects recent or current weight loss, often 
associated with disease and/or acute food shortage or emergency conditions, so is an 
indicator of transitory nutritional deprivation. Underweight captures the effects of both 
stunting and wasting, reflecting both chronic and transitory nutritional deprivation. This 
composite effect makes this indictor difficult to interpret (World Bank 2006a). Because 
weight-based measures are sensitive to recent illness and child feeding and caring 
practices, as well as seasonal variation, stunting is considered the most reliable indicator 
for identifying areas of highest need (WHO 1995 cited in Morris 2001). Because height 
and weight vary by age and sex, each measure of undernutrition is calculated in relation 
to international references for well-nourished children of the same age and sex.  
 
Maternal nutritional status is critical to infant survival and child development. Short 
maternal stature (less than 145 cm) and low body-mass index (less than 18.5 kg/m
2) have 
adverse effects on pregnancy outcomes, which, in turn, affect child growth and 
development. While energy and nutrient needs increase during pregnancy and lactation, 
mothers in developing countries often consume less food during this period (sometimes 
due to concerns about labor complications resulting from a larger baby), which can lead 
to insufficient pregnancy weight gain and micronutrient deficiencies (Levinson and 
Bassett 2007).  
 
Deficiencies in key vitamins and minerals—particularly, iron, iodine, and vitamin A, but 
also zinc, vitamins B6, B12, folate, calcium, and riboflavin—are associated with adverse 
health outcomes including heightened disease prevalence and severity, poor cognitive 
function, and increased risk of mortality. Iron deficiency is associated with poor 
pregnancy outcomes (e.g. low birthweight babies and increased risk of maternal 
mortality), impaired cognitive development, poor school performance, and reduced work 
productivity; severe iron-deficiency anemia increases the risk of mortality among women 
of childbearing age. Iodine deficiency disorders can cause irreversible mental retardation 
(cretinism), goiter, reproductive failure, and increased child mortality. Vitamin A 
deficiency compromises immunity and causes eye problems (including corneal scarring 
and blindness) and increased risk of childhood disease and death. Zinc deficiency 
hampers neurodevelopment as well as physical and reproductive growth (Levinson and 
Bassett 2007).  
2.1 Scope of the Problem 
A 2006 UNICEF report estimated that in developing countries approximately one-fourth 
of all children under five (or about 146 million children) are underweight and 30 percent 
are stunted. But the poorest countries, and the poorest within each country, suffer 
disproportionately. According to data from 11 Demographic and Health Surveys for 
countries with stunting rates above 20 percent, stunting is roughly twice as common 
among poor children compared to wealthier children. In the least developed countries, 36 
                                                 
5 Stunting, underweight, and wasting are defined as height-for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-height, 
respectively, of two or more z-scores below the international reference. 5 
 
percent of children under five are underweight and 42 percent stunted, compared to 27 
percent underweight and 31 percent stunted in developing countries. Global estimates of 
wasting are estimated to be around 10 percent (or 55 million children), with rates on the 
order of 16 percent (or 19 million children) in South-central Asia. Africa is home to the 
most countries with high stunting prevalence, although Asia accounts for the greatest 
number of stunted children. India alone, with 51 percent (or 61 million) children under 




Recent progress in reducing rates of child stunting and underweight has been uneven.  
The percentage of underweight children in China halved between 1990 and 2002 (from 
19 to 8 percent), whereas in Africa the number of malnourished children has actually 
increased since 1990, with 13 countries experiencing deteriorating nutrition status, in part 
due to the mutually reinforcing relationship between HIV and undernutrition (UNICEF 
2006; World Bank 2006a).  
 
Despite some strides in eliminating micronutrient deficiencies since the mid-1980s, these, 
too, remain widespread. Today, two billion people suffer from clinical or sub-clinical 
effects of micronutrient deficiencies. More than one-third of the world's population 
suffers from iodine deficiency (35 percent) and one-fifth suffers from zinc deficiency. 
According to nationally representative surveys spanning 1993-2005, 42 percent of 
pregnant women and 47 percent of preschool children suffer from anemia, 60 percent of 
which is attributed to iron deficiency in non-malarial areas and 50 percent in malarial 
areas (Black et al. 2008). An estimated 25 percent of preschool-aged children and 18 
percent of women are vitamin A-deficient (Borwankar et al. 2007). These figures are 
cause for concern because the effects of undernutrition can be devastating and 
irreversible and affect generations to come. 
2.2 Long-Term Consequences of Undernutrition 
There is extensive evidence of the long-term consequences of maternal and early 
childhood undernutrition. Within developing countries, child and maternal undernutrition 
is closely associated with greater risk of infant and child morbidity and mortality. 
Malnourished mothers experience higher rates of morbidity and mortality and face 
greater risks of poor pregnancy outcomes (Figueroa and Rodriguez-Garcia 2002). It is 
well documented that children born with low birthweight, due to maternal undernutrition, 
or who are nutritionally stunted in the first two years of life, face a higher risk of 
developing obesity (essentially being “programmed” to conserve fat and thus oxidizing 
fat poorly) and are more likely to suffer from chronic non-communicable diseases in 
adulthood (Forsdal 1977; Barker 1992 and 1994; Branca and Ferrari 2002).  
 
                                                 
6 In most countries maternal undernutrition (defined as body-mass index (BMI) of less than 18.5) ranges 
from 10 to 19 percent, although in sub-Saharan Africa, south-central and southeastern Asia, and Yemen 
exhibit rates of more than 20 percent and India, Bangladesh, and Eritrea have rates of roughly 40 percent 
(Black et al. 2008). 
 6 
 
A vicious negative feedback loop connects undernutrition and poor health outcomes. 
Undernutrition weakens the immune system, making children more susceptible to 
infection and disease (Mason et al. 2003; Behrman et al. 2004). Disease, in turn, is 
associated with a greater risk of undernutrition, leading to poor nutrient absorption, 
altered metabolism, and lack of appetite, which translates to a higher probability of 
inadequate nutritional intake. In a malnourished state, children suffer from impaired 
immunity, which then increases their likelihood of infection (Pelletier and Frongillo 
2003).  
 
Micronutrient deficiencies also contribute to poor health. Iodine deficiency disorders 
affect the metabolic and developmental systems in the body and can lead to irreversible 
mental retardation, reproductive failure, and increased child mortality (ICCIDD). Iron-
deficiency anemia increases maternal and infant mortality, raises the likelihood of low 
birthweight, impairs cognitive development, and reduces work productivity (FANTA 
2006). Weakening immune mechanisms, Vitamin A deficiency causes increased 
susceptibility to infection, especially respiratory infection, a range of eye problems 
(including blindness), and increased risk of childhood morbidity and mortality (West 
2003). Zinc deficiency adversely affects physical growth and neurodevelopment and is 
associated with weak immune capacity; increased risk of diarrhea, pneumonia, and 
malaria; and increased severity of diarrhea (Bhatnagar and Natchu 2004; Sanghvi et al. 
2007; Black et al. 2008).  
 
Overall, undernutrition is a factor in more than fifty percent of all deaths among children 
under-five in developing countries (Pelletier and Frongillo 2003). And the vast majority 
(83 percent) of these deaths is associated with mild or moderate, rather than severe, 
undernutrition (Behrman 2000, 7).
7 Eliminating undernutrition can reduce the global 
burden of disease and increase child survival, while reducing health care costs at both the 
household and national level (Mason et al 2003).  
 
Undernutrition is also associated with poor educational outcomes and reduced adult 
earnings. Numerous studies show that malnourished children tend to enter school later, 
repeat grades more often, and have higher dropout rates, resulting in fewer completed 
years of schooling compared to healthy children (Behrman et al. 2004; Grantham-
McGregor et al. 2007; Pollitt et al. 1995; Martorell 1994; Alderman, Hoddinott and 
Kinsey 2003; Alderman et al. 2001; Alderman et al. 2003). Short height among adults (a 
result of childhood stunting), has been associated with reduced adult earnings in 55 
countries (Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). According to a study in Brazil, a one percent 
increase in adult height was found to result in a 2.4 percent increase in adult male 
earnings (Thomas and Strauss 1997 cited in Behrman 2000, 18). Eliminating anemia 
would contribute to a 5 to 17 percent increase in lifetime earnings, a finding that, even at 
the low end, represents a significant improvement for poor families (Horton and Ross 
2003 cited in World Bank 2006a). 
                                                 
7 A new estimate from the 2008 Lancet series on maternal and child undernutrition posits that nutrition-
related factors are responsible for approximately 35 percent of child deaths and 11 percent of the global 
disease burden (Black et al. 2008). However, there is some disagreement with the methods used to 
determine this figure (Habicht 2008). 7 
 
 
Unless efforts are made to interrupt these negative feedback loops, malnourished children 
will continue to grow up to be shorter, less healthy, less educated, and poorer than 
healthy children and will be more likely to have children who are malnourished 
themselves. This cycle perpetuates an intergenerational transfer of poor nutrition and 
health, low education, and poverty (World Bank 2006a). Fortunately, interventions to 
address undernutrition can interrupt this cycle. Indeed, according to a cross-country 
review of successful nutrition programs, these interventions reduced the prevalence of 
child malnutrition (defined as underweight) by one to two percentage points per year, a 
rate two to four times higher than the average trend calculated in the absence of such 
programs (World Bank 2006a). 
2.3 Curbing Undernutrition 
Determining how best to tackle undernutrition involves deciding what intervention 
mechanism(s) to employ and when to intervene. Nutritional consequences take their 
greatest toll from pregnancy through age two, the period during which children’s growth 
rates and, therefore, nutritional requirements, are highest. During this time, children are 
dependent on others and unable to make their needs known, so are therefore more 
vulnerable to poor feeding and caring practices. Additionally, with weak immune systems 
and living in conditions of poor hygiene and sanitation, young children are highly 
susceptible to infection, which can exacerbate undernutrition. Because the damage to 
physical growth and cognitive development that accrues during pregnancy and these 
early years is largely irreversible, and because interventions after this critical period have 
little effect, early actions taken during the “window of opportunity” have the greatest 
potential for impact (World Bank 2006a).  
 
Figure 2.2 below charts child nutritional status (underweight is illustrated, but the timing 
and pattern of decline is similar for stunting) against age (Shrimpton et al. 2001). The 
large oval demonstrates a precipitous drop between 3 and 18 months of age, after which 
weight (and also height) remains below the international reference for healthy children.  
 8 
 
Figure 2.2: Window of Opportunity for Nutrition Interventions 
 
    Source: Shrimpton et al. 2001 as cited in World Bank 2006a. 
 
 
There is considerable consensus about the optimum timing of nutrition interventions: 
most researchers agree that covering the period from pregnancy through the first two 
years of life is optimal, although some prefer to target child nutrition interventions even 
more narrowly (e.g. children aged 6-11 months, when nutritional decline is most severe) 
(Shrimpton et al. 2001; World Bank 2006a). Because maternal nutritional status plays an 
important role child growth and development, there is also a movement to emphasize 
interventions during pregnancy (called the “minus-nine” period of the “window of 
opportunity”) (Shekar 2006). 
 
As for which are the most effective interventions, there is also general agreement about 
what works, but some debate about how to prioritize these actions, for example, in terms 
of the balance between preventive or curative approaches.
8 One attempt at prioritization 
comes from the Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival (BASICS II) project, 
under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which proposes six 
Essential Nutrition Actions (ENA) (listed in Box 2.2) (Archaya et al. 2004).
9 
 
                                                 
8 See Enserink 2008 for an example of the fierce debate about preventive vs. curative approaches. 
9 Other efforts to summarize the best interventions include “What Works? A Review of the Efficacy and 
Effectiveness of Nutrition Interventions” (Allen and Gillespie 2001) and “What Works? Interventions for 
maternal and child undernutrition and survival” (Bhutta et al. 2008). 9 
 
Box 2.2 Essential Nutrition Actions 
1.  Exclusive breastfeeding for six months 
2.  Adequate complementary feeding from about 6–24 months with continued 
breastfeeding for at least two years 
3.  Appropriate nutritional care of sick and severely malnourished children 
4.  Adequate intake of vitamin A for women and children 
5.  Adequate intake of iron for women and children 
6.  Adequate intake of iodine by all members of the household  
Source: Archaya et al. 2004 
 
 
The recommendations described in comparative studies and reviews and in these six 
essential actions highlight two complementary types of interventions: those that seek to 
change beneficiary behaviors via communication and education, and those that provide 
material resources and services to improve nutrition. Behavior change communication 
(BCC) for nutrition is a form of strategic communication aimed at promoting specific 
changes in behaviors that lead to good nutrition and health outcomes (e.g. exclusive 
breastfeeding, appropriate complementary feeding, appropriate caring and hygiene 
practices, compliance with supplementation regimens, dietary diversity, and appropriate 
use of available services).
10 Material resources to improve nutrition can include 
micronutrient or nutritional supplements, oral rehydration therapy (ORT) for diarrhea 
treatment, or soap to improve hygiene. Services can include health check-ups, child 
growth monitoring and promotion sessions,
11 and prenatal care, among others. These 
types of interventions are complementary in that behavior change is often required to 
ensure the successful use of material resources and services (for example, if mothers 
learn how to prepare and administer micronutrient supplements properly, the impact of 
the supplement will be greater) and material resources and services are sometimes 
necessary and helpful to facilitate critical behavioral changes (especially those related to 
hygiene and illness treatment). Each of these interventions can be tailored to a broad 
range of contexts based on the type and severity of undernutrition and the institutional, 
human, physical, and financial resources available.  
 
                                                 
10 BCC relies on community input throughout the program development and implementation process, from 
identifying problems and determining appropriate messages to designing and testing communication 
materials, to monitoring and adapting program strategies to better overcome obstacles to adoption of new 
practices (Flavin and Griffiths 1999). Successful nutrition BCC programs not only emphasize the 
benefits of specific new practices, but also help people overcome the practical, social, and cultural 
constraints that might limit the adoption of these practices among specific target groups (Allen and 
Gillespie 2001). 
11 Growth monitoring involves the regular weighing and charting of young children’s growth in order to 
catch growth faltering (an early sign of undernutrition). Deviations from expected growth trends indicate 
the onset of undernutrition or ill health, which may otherwise remain invisible except in severe cases, and 
thereby spur parents to address the problem before it becomes serious (UNICEF 2007). Beyond 
monitoring children’s growth, some programs provide counseling on ways to improve child growth and 
overall health. Growth monitoring, and increasingly, community-based growth promotion, is often used 
as a conditionality for CCTs.  10 
 
Within these two approaches, recommended nutrition interventions include:  
•  Micronutrient interventions (fortification and supplementation) 
•  Breastfeeding promotion 
•  Strategies to improve complementary feeding (feeding during the transition from 
breastfeeding to the consumption of regular foods) 
•  Education and counseling on maternal, child, and family nutrition 
•  Reduction of the disease burden (e.g. via hygiene interventions and hand-washing 
promotion) 
•  Food supplements
12 
 
According to an estimate by Bhutta et al. (2008), taken together, universal coverage of all 
nutrition-related interventions could reduce stunting prevalence by up to 36 percent and 
reduce deaths by 25 percent among children under two (Bhutta et al. 2008).
13 (Section 7 
revisits some of the best practices associated with these nutrition interventions.) 
 
3. Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 
Among efforts to reduce poverty and promote human capital investments more generally, 
momentum has been growing around the use of cash transfers, which can help overcome 
the resource constraints to behavioral change. In the past, expanding the supply—both 
availability and quality—of services by providing health clinics, schools, and other 
infrastructure, failed to sufficiently increase service utilization (Rawlings 2005a). This 
could be because even when service costs are kept low or free, supply-side interventions 
tend to be ineffective in changing patterns of use because resource constraints facing poor 
families preclude them from paying the private costs associated with using services (e.g. 
transportation and opportunity costs of time) (Maluccio and Flores 2005).  
3.1 Unconditional vs. Conditional Cash Transfers 
The idea of using cash transfers to boost demand for services is rooted in traditional 
economic theory: the assumption that individuals make rational decisions to maximize 
their own wellbeing taking into consideration benefits and costs associated with each 
decision. Decisions are made when perceived benefits outweigh perceived costs. When 
resource-constrained households receive cash, their cost-benefit considerations change, 
which, in turn, affects their decision-making calculus: for example, a cash transfer could 
                                                 
12 One of the best known examples of successful nutritional supplementation for children is the Institute of 
Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) longitudinal study in which Guatemalan children in 
four villages were randomly assigned to one of two types of food supplements—a high-energy, high-
protein supplement (called atole) and a low-energy, low-protein supplement (called fresco), both fortified 
with vitamins and minerals—and tracked through adulthood. Results of the study indicate that children 
exposed to atole during gestation and the first two years of life, compared to those exposed to fresco, 
grew to be taller and have more fat-free mass, greater work capacity, and enhanced intellectual potential 
as teenagers and young adults (Martorell 1995; Hass et al. 1995; Rivera et al. 1995). 
13 These estimates are based on models of the survival and linear growth status of the annual birth cohort of 
children from birth until 3 years of age in 36 countries with 90% of the global burden of stunted children 
(Bhutta et al. 2008). 11 
 
reduce the opportunity cost of sending children to school, making the benefits of this 
decision outweigh the costs.  
 
According to the book, Conditional Cash Transfers for Attaching Present and Future 
Poverty, unconditional cash transfers (UCTs)—cash payments with no strings attached—
should be the “theoretical default position” for cash transfers, assuming that beneficiaries 
are informed and rational actors, governments are benevolent, and markets are well-
functioning. In reality, however, these three assumptions often do not hold true. First, if 
individuals or households undervalue a good or service, do not realize its potent effect in 
the long run, or are not willing to take risks associated with using the good or service, a 
family’s privately chosen level of investment in human capital may be too low, compared 
to what is optimal. For example, families may pull children out of school before they gain 
important skills that would help them earn higher wages in the future. Second, 
government policy decisions are often determined by voting, lobbying, and bargaining, 
and therefore may not be made for the good of the people, especially the poor. Indeed, 
malnutrition is often concentrated among low-income populations with little political 
power. And third, market failures (e.g. positive externalities associated with education, 
hygiene, and health) imply that even privately optimal investment in human capital at the 
household level may not lead to socially optimal levels of investment for the population 
at large (World Bank 2008a). For instance, households that adopt better hygiene practices 
become less likely to carry diseases, conferring benefits not only to those particular 
households, but also to other households in the community that have not adopted better 
practices. Attaching conditionalities to cash transfers can help overcome these three types 
of problems. 
 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) address the problem of underinvestment in human 
capital not only by compensating individuals in the short-term for the real costs (e.g. 
transportation, lost time, and the lost labor contribution of children now in school) of 
investing in health, nutrition, and education, but also by adding requirements for 
households to use services that have long-term payoff in these areas (Medlin and de 
Walque 2008). The behavioral conditions of CCTs, in effect, transform cash transfers 
into human capital subsidies thereby stimulating the demand for services (Maluccio and 
Flores 2005). Another way to think about this is that conditions internalize positive 
externalities associated with improved education and health and “create incentives for 
individuals to adjust their behavior toward matching the social optimum” (deJanvry and 
Sadoulet 2004).  
 
CCTs can be preferable to UCTs for political economy reasons as well. Because they 
include behavioral requirements for beneficiaries, CCTs tend to be acceptable to elites 
who see such programs as a way of helping the “deserving poor,” who agree to take “co-
responsibility” for improving their lives, rather than providing free hand-outs. Growing 
urban violence in Latin America, which is often associated with poverty and inequality, 
may be another reason these programs are widely supported there; keeping kids in school 
is thought to make them less likely to resort to crime (Britto 2005).  
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Still, there are some significant disadvantages to making cash transfers conditional. There 
is a risk that the neediest household may not be able to participate if compliance is too 
costly (e.g. transportation costs too high, schools and clinics too far away, or 
opportunities costs of labor too great). And, if the quality of services is poor or there is no 
access to higher-level services, households that comply with program conditionalities 
may end up being worse off. For example, a family might be better off keeping children 
at home and teaching them important agricultural or trade skills, rather sending them to 
poor quality schools in exchange for a small income boost in the short run (World Bank 
2008a). Or a beneficiary who attends required health check-ups and learns she has a 
serious health condition requiring inaccessible higher-level care may be no better off 
having complied with conditionalities (Regalia 2006).  
 
What’s more, applying conditionalities can be a complex, cumbersome, and expensive 
process. According to a comparative analysis of cost structures across three CCTs—
Mexico (Progresa), Honduras (PRAF II), and Nicaragua (RPS pilot)—verifying 
compliance ranged from 2 to 24 percent of total administrative costs (excluding transfers) 
(Caldés et al. 2006). Verifying compliance, especially in countries with weak 
administrative capacity and institutional structures, can be particularly costly and 
overburden limited resources (Handa and Davis 2006; Adato and Bassett 2008). 
 
Altogether, to summarize the recommendations made in Conditional Cash Transfers for 
Attaching Present and Future Poverty, attaching conditions can be appropriate under the 
following circumstances: “if private investment in children’s human capital is thought to 
be too low” and “if political economy reasons mean that there is little support for 
redistribution, unless it is seen to be conditioned on ‘good behavior’ by the ‘deserving 
poor.’” But, there may be good arguments against conditioning if the same results can be 
achieved using other approaches, such as communications strategies or moral suasion 
(World Bank 2008a). (See further discussion of conditionalities with respect to nutrition 
in section 8.2.) 
3.2 A Brief History of CCTs 
The first CCTs originated in Mexico and Brazil in the late 1990s as ‘home-grown’ 
initiatives that pioneered the notion of a demand-side intervention that paired an income 
transfer with required behaviors for recipients. Both later grew into large national-scale 
programs known in Mexico as Progresa (renamed Oportunidades in 2001) and in Brazil 
as Bolsa Escola (which merged with other programs to become Bolsa Familia in 2003). 
Both Progresa and Bolsa Escola were initially designed and financed without the help of 
development banks and international funding was only introduced during subsequent 
expansion of both programs (Handa and Davis 2006; Britto 2004). Since then, there has 
been overwhelming support from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) for CCTs (Handa and Davis 2006).  
 
These early programs have become the largest and best-known CCTs and now function 
as central elements of their countries’ social protection and poverty reduction strategies. 
In 2007, Oportunidades reached close to 5 million Mexicans (about 25% of the 
population) and Bolsa Familia, reached 11.1 million Brazilian families, or more than 46 13 
 
million people, representing about 25% of the population (Rawlings 2005b; Lindert et al. 
2007) Worldwide, CCTs vary widely by scale of operation and role in the government’s 
social protection strategy (Rawlings 2005b).  
 
Because they require complementary supply-side inputs (usually schools and health 
centers), CCTs have mainly been implemented in middle-income countries with existing 
administrative capacity and available health and education services. However, interest in 
CCTs is growing throughout the developing world. After initial popularity across Latin 
America, CCTs have emerged in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and have begun to 




The evolution of CCTs occurred in several phases. The first generation of programs, 
which began in Latin America in the 1990s, typically included both education and health 
conditions. These programs have continued and are still the most common form of CCT. 
The second generation of CCTs, emerging in South and East Asia, has focused almost 
exclusively on increasing access to schooling for girls. These CCTs generally take the 
form of a scholarship programs contingent upon school attendance, but having no health 
conditionalities. Very recently, a third generation of CCTs has expanded to cover 
international emergency settings and domestic urban development programs (Kalanda 
and Magwire 2006. For example, in 2006 Mayor Bloomberg proposed a CCT as part of 
his new anti-poverty program for New York City (Dugger 2004). Other states (e.g. 
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Virginia, and the District of Columbia) are 
experimenting with CCTs for school outcomes (Haynes and Birnbaum 2008). 
 
Currently at least thirty-three countries have in place some type of CCT (and sometimes 
more than one) and a handful of other countries have conducted feasibility studies (e.g. 
Haiti) or have a CCT in the planning stage (World Bank 2008a; Cohen et al. 2007). 
Because CCTs are replicating so quickly, it is difficult to maintain an up-to-date list of all 
programs. Table 3.2 presents a list of existing programs based on information available at 
the time this paper was written. 
 
                                                 
14 Mexico provides larger transfers to girls in secondary school to encourage girls’ participation. Nicaragua 
uses a “teacher bonus” to boost education supply and quality. Jamaica targets the elderly as well as 
children and mothers with different conditionalities for each. Some programs also exempt certain 
beneficiaries who cannot meet conditionalities due to illness or disability or lack of available services 
(Adato and Bassett 2008). 14 
 
Table 3.2 CCT programs worldwide 
Existing CCTs  Pilot CCTs 
•  Argentina 
•  Bangladesh 
•  Bolivia 
•  Brazil 
•  Cambodia 
•  Chile 
•  Colombia 
•  Dominican 
Republic 
•  Ecuador 
•  El Salvador 
•  Honduras 
•  Indonesia 
•  Jamaica 
•  Kenya* 
•  Mexico 
•  Nicaragua 
•  Pakistan 
•  Panama 
•  Paraguay 
•  Peru 
•  Philippines 
•  Turkey 
•  United States 
(NYC) 
•  Yemen 
•  Burkina Faso* 
•  Guatemala 
•  India 
•  Indonesia 
•  Morocco* 
•  Nigeria 
•  Sierra Leone 
•  Tanzania 
•  Uganda* 
* Programs testing a mix of conditional and unconditional transfers 
Sources: Adato and Bassett 2008; American India Foundation 2008; Arulpragasam 2008; BBC News 2007; 
Kalanda and Magwire 2006; MGLSD 2007; Salazar, personal communication 2008; Soares 2008; World 
Bank 2008a.  
3.3 The Popularity of CCTs 
Since the 1990s when Brazil and Mexico launched the first CCTs, such programs have 
rapidly gained renown. Nancy Birdsall, President of the Center for Global Development, 
said of CCTs: “I think these programs are as close as you can come to a magic bullet in 
development” (Dugger 2004). Many governments and development practitioners have 
hailed CCTs as a cutting-edge development tool whose appeal rests, in large part, on the 
ability to alleviate poverty in the short run and to break the cycle of poverty through 
improvements in human capital in the long run. 
 
CCTs fit nicely into the mainstream discourse on poverty reduction by addressing key 
themes such as targeting, participation, multisectoralism, and women’s empowerment 
(Britto 2004). Evidence has shown that CCTs are generally well targeted to the poorest 
households (with CCT benefits to the poorest quintile 3 to 30 times as large as those to 
the richest quintile) (Schady 2006a). The participatory nature of CCTs varies from 
country to country, but many programs make use of a community committee, which 
collaborates with central and municipal planning groups.
15 Often there is also a 
community representative (usually a local female CCT recipient), who communicates 
with other beneficiary families about the arrival of transfers, explains and clarifies co-
responsibilities (conditionalities), and encourages compliance. By participating in 
program activities and playing an active role as agents of their own development, it is 
hoped that beneficiaries will become empowered and continue to help their children and 
their families, even after program benefits end (Oportunidades 2003). Because they 
tackle several interrelated development problems in a single policy, capitalizing on the 
synergies among education, health, nutrition, and empowerment of women, CCTs are 
also lauded for having a multisectoral development approach.  
 
Many CCTs have been designed with gender impacts in mind. Generally, women are 
designated as the direct recipients of cash, based on evidence that providing money to 
women leads to greater impacts on the wellbeing of children (Haddad et al. 1997 and 
                                                 
15 Colombia and Brazil have the most decentralized CCT organizational structures.  15 
 
Hoddinott and Haddad 1995, among others).
16 This design component may also 
contribute to empowering women by giving them increased access to resources and, in 
some cases, a greater role in household decision-making (Handa et al. 2001; Schady and 
Rosero 2007; Adato et al. 2000; Adato and Roopnarnaine 2004).
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Finally, the fact that CCTs have been carefully evaluated and have demonstrated success 
in achieving many of their objectives has been instrumental in sustaining support for 
existing CCTs as well as stimulating their replication elsewhere. Since their inception, 
CCT programs have been accompanied by systematic efforts to evaluate impacts on 
household behaviors (e.g. school enrollment and attendance, use of preventive healthcare 
services, and food consumption) and health and nutrition outcomes resulting from these 
behaviors (e.g. illness, stunting, and anemia prevalence) (Rawlings 2005a).  
 
CCT impacts vary by the specifics of program design, such as targeting effectiveness, 
size of the transfer, quality of services (e.g. teachers and health staff), enforcement of 
program conditionalities, and offsetting adjustments (e.g. crowding out of labor and 
private transfers), as well as by the degree to which transfers are productively invested. 
Overall, the evidence indicates a clear trend in increased service utilization (i.e. school 
enrollment and healthcare use), but mixed impacts on final outcomes, such as test scores, 
illness prevalence, and nutritional status. Appendix 1 presents a table with evidence of 
the outcomes and impacts of CCTs in Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and 
Nicaragua and Appendix 2 provides information on each evaluation. 
 
4. Rationale for a Closer Link between CCTs and Nutrition 
There are two ways of thinking about why improving nutrition is a sensible and feasible 
objective for CCT programs. First, CCTs and nutrition interventions share common 
overarching development objectives: to reduce poverty and improve the welfare of the 
poorest, most marginalized members of society. The primary objectives of CCTs are to 
reduce consumption poverty and to generate long-term wellbeing through investments in 
child human capital; nutrition interventions also promote long-term wellbeing, 
particularly children’s cognitive, physical, and economic potential, via improved growth 
and development. Improved nutritional status can strengthen the complementary 
interactions that CCTs promote among human capital investments in education and 
health.  
 
Second, operationally, the very structure of CCT programs provides some natural entry 
points for improving nutrition. CCTs target poor children, who are often most at risk of 
experiencing undernutrition. The experience of poverty and malnutrition at this time in 
the lifecycle can have cumulative, long-term consequences. Also, young children benefit 
most from the holistic investments in human capital that CCTs provide (Farrington and 
                                                 
16 Evaluations underway in Burkina Faso, Morocco, and Yemen will compare the impact of delivering cash 
to men/fathers versus women/mothers (World Bank 2008a). 
17 In Mexico, factors like the woman’s level of education, work experience prior to marriage, and ability to 
speak Spanish were the most consistent determinants of intrahousehold decision-making patterns (Adato 
et al. 2000). 16 
 
Slater 2006). Health and nutrition transfers generally focus on children under five, 
covering the time of life—the first two years—when nutritional deficits take their highest 
toll.  
 
CCTs also transfer cash directly to mothers, who are most likely to use resources for 
increased expenditure on food and other basic household needs, leading to better nutrient 
consumption for their children. Studies have shown that a larger share of resources given 
to mothers is directed toward child health and nutrition, compared to resources given to 
fathers (Hoddinott 2008; Haddad and Hoddinott 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995).  
 
The cash transfer itself addresses one of the fundamental causes of undernutrition, the 
lack of household purchasing power. Increased income can contribute to improved 
nutritional status (e.g. through increased quantity and quality of food consumed); 
however, income gains alone are not sufficient to eliminate undernutrition without 
complementary interventions that address other important determinants (Alderman et al. 
2005). Indeed, notable reductions in undernutrition are unlikely without addressing 
dietary quality and key behaviors such as young child feeding practices, pregnancy 
behaviors, and sanitation practices.  
 
One concern among those working in the area of nutrition is the fact that demand for 
nutrition interventions is often low due to the limited physical visibility of many 
nutritional deficiencies (known as “hidden hunger”). Indeed, in some communities where 
the majority of children are short for their age, community members expect their children 
to be short and therefore do not recognize stunting as a problem (World Bank 2006b; 
Levinson and Bassett 2007). That CCTs incentivize participation in activities and 
services that promote good nutrition, and increase beneficiary contact with people 
providing messages about improved behaviors, could make them an effective vehicle for 
improving nutritional status.  
 
Widespread support for CCTs, among countries and donors alike, is also an important 
factor when considering the promise of CCTs as a tool to reduce undernutrition. If 
designed and implemented appropriately—using the improvement of nutritional status as 
a specific objective, designing program components to affect this outcome directly, and 
placing these efforts in the context of a coordinated nutrition policy—CCTs could 
produce greater impacts on nutrition, as well as education and health outcomes. 
 
5. Attention to Nutrition in Existing CCTs  
So far, many CCTs include health conditionalities, usually requiring check-ups for young 
children and sometimes for pregnant and nursing women, but fewer programs include 
nutrition-specific conditionalities that address caring, feeding, and hygiene practices that 
influence child nutrition. Those CCTs that do employ nutrition-related conditionalities 
generally require participation in (a) education workshops that seek to increase maternal 
knowledge and improve practices related to proper child care and feeding practices, 
sanitation, and dietary diversity, and/or (b) growth monitoring for young children, which 
sometimes includes standardized or individualized counseling on ways to improve child 17 
 
growth. Whereas the nutrition education approach seeks to improve nutritional status by 
teaching new practices at a group level, the growth monitoring and promotion approach 
focuses on catching bad practices at an individual level and addressing them directly with 
mothers. Some CCT programs also provide micronutrient or nutritional supplements for 
children and/or pregnant and lactating women. Table 5 compares the nutrition-related 
services and conditionalities in 20 CCTs for which information is currently available. 
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Table 5: Nutrition-related Service and Conditionalities in CCT Programs 








Argentina   Programa Familias  3children & pregnant 
women       
Bolsa Alimentação  3 children 0-15 & 
pregnant women 
3  3    Brazil 
 
Bolsa Familia  3 children 0-6 & 
pregnant women 
3    
Chile  Subsidio Unitario 
Familiar  3 children 0-6       
Colombia Familias  en  Acción  3 children 0-6  3  3encouraged, 
but not required   
Dominican 
Republic  Solidaridad  3 children 0-5  3    
Ecuador  Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano  3 children 0-5  3    
El Salvador  Red Solidaria  3 children 0-5 & 
pregnant women 
3  3   
Honduras PRAF  II  3 children & 
pregnant women 
3    
Indonesia  Program Keluarga 
Harapan 
3 children 0-6 & 
pregnant women      
Jamaica PATH  3 children 0-6 & 
pregnant women      
Kenya
  Cash Transfer for 
OVC  3 children 0-5  3    3 (vitamin A) 
Mexico Oportunidades  3 children & adults  3  3 
3 (iron & papilla 
nutritional 
supplement) 
Nicaragua  Red de Protección 
Social  3 children 0-5  3  3  3
 (iron) 
Panama  Red de 
Oportunidades  3 children 0-5       
Paraguay Tekopora  Program 3 children 0-14 & 
pregnant women 
3    
Peru Juntos  3 children 0-5 & 
pregnant women  planned 




Philippines  Ahon Pamilyang 
Pilipino 
3children 0-5 & 
pregnant women      
Turkey  Social Risk 
Mitigation Project 
3 children 0-6 & 
pregnant women      
Uganda  Cash Transfer pilot  3 infants       
* Indicates growth monitoring either with or without counseling.  
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Of the 20 CCTs listed above, all require health check-ups for children (and some for 
pregnant women) and nearly two-thirds require growth monitoring (whether with 
accompanying counseling or not). Six programs include group counseling on health and 
nutrition, although of these, Colombia’s CCT does not require participation and El 
Salvador’s does not monitor participation. Only three programs provide micronutrient 
supplements and only one provides a nutritional supplement.  
 
The following subsections present a more detailed discussion of the design, 
implementation, and impacts of five CCT programs featuring nutrition-related 
conditionalities for which there are evaluation results. Most of these programs are 
dynamic, and whatever implementation (and sometimes even design) issues were 
relevant at the date for which evaluations were completed may not apply now. The goal 
of this discussion is not to portray the programs as they currently operate, but to illustrate 
the approaches they have taken and the results they have produced in order to highlight 
issues that existing programs could face going forward, or new programs could encounter 
as they roll out. Appendix 1 presents evaluations results for health and nutrition in table 
form.
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5.1 Brazil  
Brazil’s national health-related CCT, Bolsa Alimentação, launched in 2001 (and merged 
with three other programs to form Bolsa Familia in 2003), provided eligible households 
with a cash transfer equivalent to $6.25-18.70 per month, depending on the number of 
beneficiaries in the household (de la Brière and Rawlings 2006; Olinto et al. 2003).  The 
following groups were eligible for the transfer: pregnant women, mothers with children 
0-6 months for whom breastmilk was the child’s principal source of food, and children 
from six months to seven years of age. (After age seven, children became eligible for 
Brazil’s education CCT, Bolsa Escola.) Bolsa Alimentação beneficiaries were required to 
commit to program conditionalities via a “Charter of Responsibilities,” which outlined 
the compulsory program activities: regular attendance at antenatal care and attendance at 
health and nutrition education sessions for mothers and attendance at facility-based child 
growth monitoring sessions and compliance with vaccination schedules for children aged 
six months to six years. In practice, because only children 0-6 months who were breastfed 
were eligible for program benefits, breastfeeding could be considered an implied program 
conditionality as well (Olinto et al. 2003).  
 
According to a 2001-2002 evaluation looking at the impact of Bolsa Alimentação on food 
consumption, the program resulted in a 9 percent increase in household dietary diversity, 
which is estimated to be associated with a 6 percent increase in per capita caloric 
availability and a 12 percent increase in caloric availability from non-staple foods 
(especially fruits and vegetables) (Olinto et al. 2003).
19 Despite this positive impact on 
food consumption, a final impact evaluation by IFPRI found that the program had a 
                                                 
18 See Adato and Bassett 2008 for CCT impacts on education outcomes and poverty. 
19 This is based on a calculation by Hoddinott and Yohannes, which assumes that a 1 percent increase in 
dietary diversity is associated with a 0.7 percent increase in per capita caloric availability (Olinto et al. 
2003). 20 
 
deleterious impact on child growth. Beneficiary children, who at baseline had been 
growing faster than control children—children who had been selected to receive program 
benefits, but subsequently excluded due to random and quasi-random administrative 
errors
20—began to grow less rapidly upon receiving the transfer (IFPRI 2003b). 
According to analysis by Morris et al. (2004), beneficiary children under three 
experienced lower weight gain (from 31 ±7 grams/month, or 40 ±9 grams/month if the 
analysis excluded children receiving Bolsa Escola) compared to non-beneficiary children. 
Also, beneficiary children under-two demonstrated lower mean weight-for-age z-scores 
(by 0.25) and lower mean height-for-age z-scores (by 0.11) than their non-beneficiary 
counterparts, though this is not statistically significant (Morris et al. 2004).  
 
The adverse impact may have resulted from beneficiary mothers assuming that they 
would become ineligible for the transfer if their children were healthy, as was the case in 
a previous nutrition program, Incentivo para o Combate de Carencias Nutricionais. If 
this were indeed true, mothers may have limited their children's food intakes, or health 
personnel may have adjusted weight data to prevent children from being dropped from 
the program (IFPRI 2003b; Morris et al. 2004). Neither of these hypotheses have been 
confirmed. 
 
Since these negative findings, there appears to be an improvement in child growth as 
noted in both subsequent evaluations of Bolsa Alimentação and Bolsa Familia (Olinto 
undated; MSD 2005). Bolsa Familia provides a monthly transfer of $32 to all extremely 
poor households, regardless of household composition, and $66 to poor households with 
children up to 15 years of age and/or a pregnant woman. A growth monitoring 
conditionality is still in place. According to the 2005 Chamada Nutricional (Nutritional 
Call), an evaluation of Bolsa Familia in Brazil’s semi-arid regions, participation in the 
program had a positive impact on child growth, at least for the youngest children. 
Stunting among beneficiary children 6-11 months was 3.3 percentage points (5.3 vs. 2 
percent) lower than among non-beneficiary children. There was no significant impact on 
children 12-36 months (MSD 2005). This may be because some of these children did not 
begin to receive benefits during the earliest months of life—there is no information on of 
the timing of program enrollment for children in the study—or because growth 
monitoring at health center visits was irregular, despite the conditionality attached to 
growth monitoring (MSD 2005; Soares et al. 2007). More likely, however, the lack of 
impact on nutritional status among children 12-36 months was due to supply-side 
constraints. A lack of health services available to beneficiaries was estimated to be the 
most important limiting factor, and there is no evidence of reluctance among households 
to use health services.  
 
                                                 
20 Some beneficiaries were lost when household identification information was accidentally separated into 
two files or when data-processing software rejected applications with names that had common, but non-
standard characters, such as é, ç, or ô (Olinto et al. 2003); these were considered random errors. Some 
eligible individuals were not selected when personal information recorded on Bolsa Alimentação 
registration forms did not match information on the same family recorded for Bolsa Escola, another 
CCT. Because this situation was more likely to arise among families already registered in for Bolsa 
Escola, it is considered quasi-random (Morris et al. 2004). 21 
 
One important caveat is worth mentioning about this evaluation: the sample was based on 
a self-selected group of 16,239 children under-five who attended the health center on 
Brazil’s national Health and Nutrition Day—a day dedicated to evaluating various 
aspects of health and nutrition among children and mothers including, nutritional status, 
hemoglobin levels, breastfeeding status, compliance with prenatal care and child growth 
and development monitoring, recent illness, and participation in food support programs 
(MSD 2005). This sampling strategy likely caused selection bias because it only captured 
children who attended health centers and missed those who remained at home. 
Characteristics associated with the likelihood of attending the Health and Nutrition 
Day—such as parents’ education level, income level, and motivation—would also affect 
nutritional outcomes among these omitted children.
21 Evaluators did not correct for the 
non-random selection or for the initial nutritional status of children in the study sample 
(Soares et al. 2007). 
5.2 Colombia 
Familias en Acción was introduced in 2001 to assist poor families with children in both 
rural and urban areas. The program provides a nutritional subsidy of approximately $15 
per month to beneficiary families with children under the age of six. The conditionalities 
attached to this transfer include participation in growth and development check-ups by 
children under five and the maintenance of up-to-date vaccinations. Growth monitoring is 
based on a nationwide Growth and Development program in which children are weighed 
and measured during preventive healthcare visits and mothers are provided with advice 
about child nutrition.
22 Under Familias en Acción, children are expected to participate in 
Growth and Development until age seven, but the frequency of these visits varies by the 
child’s age (Attanasio et al. 2005b). Mothers are also encouraged to attend courses on 
hygiene, diet and other topics related to health and nutrition, but this is not compulsory 
(Attanasio et al. 2005a). 
 
A pre-post cluster matched evaluation of Familias en Acción in 2002-2003, using a quasi-
experimental approach, indicates a number of positive impacts.
23 CCT participation 
increased overall household consumption, by 19.5 percent in rural areas and 9.3 percent 
in urban areas. Although the share of food within each household remained constant, 
most of the increase in consumption in both urban and rural areas was dedicated to higher 
quality foods such as protein-rich foods (meat and dairy) and micronutrient-rich foods 
                                                 
21 Although the Chamada Nutricional assumes a 100% attendance rate among children under-five, an 
estimate by a regionally and nationally representative survey commissioned by the Ministry of Social 
Development in 2005 (the Avalação de Impacto do Bolsa Familia, AIBF), found that only 23 to 25 
percent of children in its sample had vaccination cards (Soares et al. 2007). 
22 According to the impact evaluation by Attanasio and Gomez, during the child’s most recent Growth and 
Development visit, only just over half of the mothers received nutritional counseling (Attanasio and 
Gomez 2004). 
23 Random assignment was not feasible for political reasons, but the authors explain that the evaluation 
controlled for pre-program differences in outcomes of interest using difference-in-differences 
methodology and propensity score matching techniques (Attanasio and Mesnard 2006a). Some concerns 
about the methodology include: the relatively small sample (roughly half the size considered ideal for the 
study) and the fact that there was incomplete baseline data for some of the intervention groups (IFS). 
Furthermore, cluster correlation was not accounted for and differences between baseline and control 
groups were not specified (Lagarde et al. 2007). 22 
 
(fruits and vegetables). Meat and dairy consumption increased by19 percent, fats by 14-
24 percent (in urban and rural, respectively) and grains by 9-17 percent (in urban and 
rural, respectively) (Attanasio and Gomez 2004; Attanasio and Mesnard 2006). Among 
children 24-60 months, consumption of both animal source foods and vegetables 
increased considerably, with vegetable consumption up 0.91 to 1.23 days per week and 
chicken consumption up by 0.25 to 0.38 days per week (Attanasio et al. 2005). 
 
Participation in Familias en Acción also increased health care service utilization among 
beneficiaries. Attendance at growth and development check-ups by children below 24 
months began at about 40 percent at baseline and increased by 23-30 percentage points 
among children benefiting from the CCT. For children 24-48 months of age, attendance 
increased by an estimated 33-50 percentage points from a starting rate of 67 percent 
(Attanasio and Gomez 2004; Attanasio et al. 2005).
24 Diarrhea incidence (an immediate 
cause of undernutrition) fell by 10.6 percent for children under 24 months and by 10.9 
percent for children 24-48 months in rural areas. Beneficiary children under 24 months 
benefited from an increase of roughly .16 z-scores; for a child 12 months old, this is 
equivalent to an increase of .43 centimeters. Overall, the impact on anthropometry 
translates to a 6.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of being stunted (Attanasio 
et al. 2005b).  
5.3 Honduras  
The Family Allowance Program, Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF), began in 
1990 to help poor families adjust to lost purchasing power resulting from macroeconomic 
adjustment. In 1998 the program was restructured and renamed PRAF/IDB – Phase II (or 
PRAF II) and the focus shifted to investment in human capital (IFPRI website). PRAF II 
(hereafter referred to as PRAF in this paper) consists of two types of CCT benefits. One 
benefit is a demand-side CCT for poor families, which provides a cash transfer three 
times a year to pregnant women and mothers with children under three (for a maximum 
of two transfers per household). Conditionalities for this transfer include five ante-natal 
care visits during pregnancy and a perinatal check-up within ten days of delivery for 
mothers and attendance at regular health check-ups and participation in monthly growth 
monitoring sessions for children under three (Glewwe and Olinto 2004; Flores et al. 
2003). The growth monitoring process is based on the country’s national community-
based nutrition program, Atención Integral a la Niñez Comunitaria (AIN-C), and 
includes personalized counseling and instruction for mothers on feeding and hygiene 
practices (Marini et al. 2008).  
 
The second type of benefit is a supply-side incentive provided to health centers and 
schools. In addition to the provision of the community-based growth monitoring and 
counseling intervention, AIN-C, a monetary transfer is provided to primary health care 
teams, made up of community members and local health care workers (nurses or doctors) 
conditional on the implementation of a quality improvement process at each health 
center. Called “Total Quality Management,” this process requires that each team prepare 
a plan outlining specific tasks and a budget for equipment and medicine required for the 
                                                 
24 The lower impact estimates in each range come from Attanasio et al. 2005 and the upper estimates come 
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health center. The cash incentive for health centers was determined based on the size of 
the target population and the number of health professionals employed, and averaged 
about $6,000 per health team per year. Supply enhancement for schools included a 
monetary transfer to Parent Teacher Associations, who faced similar requirements (e.g. 
plans for quality improvement and budget) to those of the health care teams (IFPRI 
2003a; Flores et al. 2003; Glewwe and Olinto 2004). 
 
The impact evaluation of PRAF, covering the period 2000-2002, considered both 
demand-side and supply-side benefits, as well as a combination of the two (demand-plus-
supply), and compared each of these three groups to a control group receiving no benefits 
(all randomly assigned). Findings from the intermediate report
25 indicate that changes in 
health service utilization varied by intervention type, with the demand-side intervention 
producing the largest impacts. The demand-side intervention induced a 21 percentage 
point increase in the percentage of children under three visiting healthcare provision 
units, while the supply-side intervention had no impact, and the demand-plus-supply 
intervention caused a 15 percentage point increase. The same pattern characterized 
participation in child growth monitoring and prenatal visits. The demand-side 
intervention resulted in an increase in the percentage of pregnant women having attended 
five or more antenatal care sessions by 19.5 percentage points compared to 18 percentage 
points under the demand-plus-supply intervention, and 14 percentage points under the 
supply-side intervention. Attendance at growth monitoring by children under-three 
increased by 22 percentage points under the demand-side intervention versus 17 
percentage points in the demand-plus-supply intervention. Attendance remained constant 
for beneficiaries receiving the supply-only intervention and fell among those in the 
control group (IFPRI 2003a). PRAF demonstrated no impact on food consumption or 
dietary diversity (IFPRI 2003a). 
 
Despite increased attendance at healthcare services and growth monitoring, which 
included individualized counseling for mothers on topics such as infant feeding and 
hygiene practices, PRAF had no impact on the prevalence of child stunting or anemia for 
any group. Indeed, PRAF even failed to protect children from worsening nutritional 
status (marked by increased prevalence of underweight and wasting) resulting from the 
coffee crisis (Flores et al. 2003).  
 
According to the intermediate report, PRAF's lack of impact on nutritional status and 
food consumption is likely due, in part, to the small size of the transfer, which, at roughly 
$4 per month, represents less than 3.6 percent of average beneficiary expenditure, and the 
infrequent (three times per year) distribution of the transfer (IFPRI 2003a). Perhaps most 
important, however, is the fact that despite explicit efforts to improve supply, the transfer 
of healthcare quality incentives was much lower than expected. Due to legal difficulties 
in providing monetary transfers to health centers, these were replaced with equipment 
and supply purchases. However, no health center received more than 57 percent of the 
value of their expected annual incentive and on average, supplies and equipment 
accounted for only 17 percent of the total value of the incentive. Furthermore, AIN-C, the 
                                                 
25 A final evaluation report was never completed because the Honduran government suspended the 
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community-based growth promotion program, was implemented at only 11 to 22 percent 
of the intended level and training to ensure high-quality service provision was not 
completed. This is consistent with the small and statistically insignificant impacts among 
those beneficiaries who only received the supply-side benefit and the lack of any 
marginal impact of the supply-plus-demand transfer (IFPRI 2003a).  
5.4 Nicaragua 
Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (RPS), modeled after Progresa, was launched in 
2000 and suspended in 2007. When it was active RPS exhibited a wide set of program 
conditionalities that directly affected nutritional status. All households eligible for RPS 
received a bono alimentario or “food security transfer” valued at roughly $19 per month 
per household for a period of three years.
26 Program conditionalities included bimonthly 
participation in health/nutrition workshops for adults, reproductive health workshops for 
adolescents (about sexual health and prevention of STIs and HIV/AIDS), and preventive 
health appointments (including pre- and post-natal check-ups and vaccination) for 
mothers and young children. The food security transfer decreased gradually over the 
course of the three years that beneficiaries were in the program.
27 Health services—
including vaccination, vitamin A and iron supplementation, anti-parasitics, contraception, 
and pre- and post-natal care—were available to beneficiaries for free for a five-year 
period (Maluccio and Flores 2005; Adato and Roopnaraine 2004). 
 
The nutrition/health education workshops were offered semimonthly by personnel from 
the health system, with the support of a local volunteer beneficiary, called a promotora. 
Promotoras were elected by other beneficiaries to serve as their liaison with the program 
and trained in workshop topics as well as leadership and community development. Each 
session, with about 20 women, covered topics like hygiene, breastfeeding and other child 
caring and feeding practices, nutritional value of foods and proper storage and 
preparation, and reproductive health (Maluccio and Flores 2005).  
 
The health conditionalities for children included attendance of children aged 0-5 at 
growth monitoring sessions based on a protocol adapted from Honduras’ community-
based nutrition program, AIN-C, and run by contracted health staff. According to 
Nicaragua’s Ministry of Health protocol for growth monitoring and promotion, children 
under one had to attend monthly, children under five bimonthly, and children aged 0-9 
must maintain up-to-date vaccination schedules (Maluccio and Flores 2005). 
 
While RPS focused primarily on promoting demand for services, the program also 
addressed the supply and quality of these services to meet increased demand and, unlike 
Honduras, Nicaragua was able to successfully improve the supply of services. Early in 
the RPS planning process, the Ministry of Health was concerned that it did not have the 
infrastructural capacity to manage, finance, and expand its health services programming 
to rural areas. In response, RPS included funding to allow the Ministry of Health to train 
                                                 
26 Eligible families with children 7-13 also received an education transfer. For more information, see 
Maluccio and Flores 2005. 
27 RPS’s education transfer, on the other hand, remained constant over the three-year period (Adato and 
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and pay private providers (often NGOs) who would manage rural health teams delivering 
the healthcare services required by the program (Maluccio and Flores 2005; Adato and 
Roopnaraine, 2004). RPS also addressed supply constraints within its education 
component by awarding each child a bono a la oferta or “teacher transfer,” of $0.70-1.00, 
which each child gave directly to the teacher. Half of the bonus stayed with the teacher as 
an incentive for the additional reporting duties and larger class size associated with RPS; 
the other half was earmarked for school improvements (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). 
 
A randomized impact evaluation comparing treatment and control communities at 
baseline (2000) and at two follow-up points (2001 and 2002), coupled with ethnographic 
research, provide insight into the operation and effectiveness of RPS. For example, 
ethnographic research indicated that mothers were not accustomed to learning in a 
workshop environment and did not learn well when they had to concentrate for long 
periods of time (workshops were found to last for about four hours). Furthermore, due to 
the large number of RPS mothers in each community and the limited number of 
facilitators, workshops were large (facilitator: participant ratios were between 2:35 and 
2:50) and therefore provided little personal attention (Caldés and Maluccio 2005; Adato 
and Roopnaraine 2004). However, there is some evidence that information conveyed in 
the nutrition education workshops was shared among households. Indeed, more than half 
of RPS households said they shared something they learned with other households. 
Workshop facilitators confirmed this practice, although they claimed that it occurred less 
often. The evaluation team found that information sharing was more likely to occur 
among beneficiary households, although it did sometimes take place between beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary households (Adato and Roopnaraine 2004).  
 
Although RPS specified that beneficiaries should use the food security transfer, in part, 
for the purchase of nutritious foods, this was not monitored. According to qualitative 
research, however, some of the community promotoras checked receipts, creating the 
impression that spending on food was a requirement. But this was not a practice that the 
program promoted or even approved of (Adato and Roopnaraine 2004). 
 
Nicaragua’s experience using a community-based growth monitoring (CBGP) 
conditionality raises some important concerns about linking these types of programs. 
Even though Nicaragua had an existing CBGP program, called PROCOSAN, RPS 
introduced its own CBGP activities. Where RPS overlapped with PROCOSAN, there was 
confusion, territoriality, and duplication of efforts. For example, some RPS personnel 
accepted children’s weights taken by PROCOSAN, while others rejected these and 
reweighed children themselves. This denigration of PROCOSAN workers, who were 
volunteers, caused significant tension between RPS and PROCOSAN program staff 
(McGuire 2006).  
 
The motivation for program staff to follow through with program activities also varied 
between the two programs. The fact that the CBGP services provided by RPS were often 
focused on meeting conditionalities (recording monthly weights) for the cash transfer 
more than fulfilling the wider set of CBGP goals (e.g. participation in counseling and 
community mobilization), meant that the counseling for behavior change element was 26 
 
neglected. RPS staff did not do as much individual counseling as PROCOSAN 
volunteers, nor did they conduct as many home visits (McGuire 2006). These examples 
also suggest that emphasizing the essential counseling component of CBGP activities is 
of critical importance, particularly when monitoring conditionalities can take center 
stage. 
 
According to the RPS evaluation, the combination of cash transfers and supply-side 
enhancements resulted in some notable impacts on food consumption, health, and 
nutrition. After two years in the program, the budget share allocated to food in RPS 
beneficiary households increased by 4.5 percentage points. This reflected a reduction in 
food expenditures among control households during the coffee crisis and economic 
downturn, rather an increase in the food share of beneficiaries, suggesting a protective 
effect of RPS during economic hardship (Maluccio and Flores 2005). By 2002, RPS 
beneficiaries consumed more food items than control households (16 and 12 food items, 
respectively, out of a list of 60, excluding tobacco and alcohol). RPS beneficiaries also 
ate more nutrient-dense foods (e.g. fruits, vegetables, and animal products), which were 
encouraged in the education sessions, and less of two staples (beans and grains) 
(Maluccio and Flores 2005).  
 
Impacts on service utilization were also significant. There was an estimated 13-
percentage point impact on the percentage of children who were seen and weighed by 
health care providers. (This impact reflected a 15.2 percentage point increase among 
control households and a 28.3 percentage point increase among beneficiary 
households.
28) The impact on the percentage of children under three attending well-child 
health check-ups was of similar magnitude, at an estimated 16.3 percentage point 
increase for RPS households in 2001; this difference fell to 8.4 percentage points in 2002 
when attendance among the control group increased by 10.5 percentage points and 
attendance among RPS beneficiaries fell slightly.
29 Impacts were higher for children aged 
3-5 compared to children aged 0-3, which is not ideal in terms of nutritional impact, 
unless attendance was already much higher in the lower age group (Maluccio and Flores 
2005). 
 
Still, RPS’s impact on nutritional status was quite impressive. The net effect of RPS was 
in increase in mean height-for-age z-scores of 0.17 and a 5.5 percentage point reduction 
in the prevalence of stunting among children under five. Among RPS beneficiaries, 
stunting fell from 39.8 to 36.5 percent, while in control areas stunting rates increased 
slightly from 39.5 to 41.7 percent (Maluccio and Flores 2005). This reduction among 
beneficiaries was more than one and a half times faster than the national rate of annual 
                                                 
28 The increase in control group usage of health services could be a result of new healthcare services being 
established, a reduction in attendance at public clinics (as RPS beneficiaries moved to other clinics), 
which may have reduced waiting time and therefore made health centers more accessible to control 
households, or anticipation on the part of control households of receiving RPS benefits (Maluccio and 
Flores 2005).   
29 Poorer RPS households experienced greater changes in children's attendance in growth monitoring with a 
29.9 percentage point increase among extremely poor households compared to a 23.5 percentage point 
increase among poor households. This may indicate that RPS caused the poorest households, which did 
not attend health centers prior to the transfer, to do so (Maluccio and Flores 2005). 27 
 
improvement (based on the period 1998-2001). Notably, “very few programs in the world 
have shown such a decrease in stunting in such a short time” (Maluccio and Flores 2005). 
The positive impacts of RPS may have resulted from the relatively large transfer, 
representing 18 percent of average monthly household expenditure, as well as the range 
of nutrition-related conditionalities, albeit imperfectly implemented (Maluccio and Flores 
2005).  
 
It is striking that there was no program impact on anemia despite the fact that RPS 
provided an iron supplement. Qualitative research indicates that supplement delivery was 
sometimes inconsistent due to delivery problems and shortages—only one in five RPS 
children under-five had received the supplement in the previous four months—and 
supplements were not always consumed because of unpleasant taste and negative 
gastrological effects (Adato and Roopnaraine 2004).  
5.5 Mexico 
Progresa (now called Oportunidades) was started in 1997 and has become the model for 
numerous CCT programs. (This discussion will focus on Progresa, but also bring in 
design modifications and lessons learned from Oportunidades.) Having been designed 
based on an understanding of specific nutrition problems in the target population (child 
stunting and anemia) Progresa-Oportunidades has featured significant attention to 
nutrition and sound nutrition-related planning. By targeting pregnant and lactating 
women, children 6-23 months of age, and children 2-4 years old with low weight, the 
program focuses on high-risk groups during critical periods of growth and development 
(Neufeld 2006). The health and nutrition components include: a basic package of primary 
health care services, improved supply of health services, nutrition and health education 
sessions for families, and nutritional supplements for young children and pregnant and 
lactating women (Skoufias 2005). 
 
Under Progresa, eligible families received a bimonthly health and nutrition transfer 
representing about 20 percent of average month household expenditures (Skoufias 2005). 
Women were required to attend five prenatal check-ups, as well as one check-up during 
the month following childbirth and one during lactation. In addition to pre- and post-natal 
care, these visits address basic household sanitation, family planning, prevention and 
treatment of common illnesses (e.g. diarrhea, respiratory diseases, tuberculosis, and high 
blood pressure), and first aid. Children were required to follow the prescribed preventive 
health protocol, which included vaccinations, antiparasitics, and supervision of child 
growth and nutrition.
30 Youth above 17 and adults in beneficiary households had to 
attend annual check-ups as well. To facilitate compliance with these visits, beneficiaries 
were provided with an appointment booklet listing the schedule of appointments for each 
household member (Skoufias 2005). 
 
Like RPS, Progresa also used a promotora, a beneficiary elected by fellow beneficiaries, 
to serve as a program liaison. After her initial training, the promotora became responsible 
                                                 
30 The regimen involved three check-ups for children 0-4 months, eight check-ups for children 4-24 
months, three check-ups per year for children 2-4 years old, and two check-ups per year for children 5-16 
years (Skoufias 2005). 28 
 
for holding monthly beneficiary meetings and for providing information about transfers, 
beneficiary rights and responsibilities, and other program details. Promotoras also 
listened to questions and complaints from beneficiaries and communicated these to 
program offices (Adato et al. 2000). 
 
In order to support the increased demand that the CCT would generate resources were 
dedicated to strengthening the supply of health services. In particular, resources were 
allocated to ensuring adequate supply of equipment, medicines, and materials (including 
educational materials), encouraging medical staff to remain present in rural areas on a 
long-term basis, and providing additional training to improve quality and capacity 
(Skoufias 2005). 
 
Progresa also provided a nutritional supplement (called a papilla) to pregnant and 
lactating women, children between 4 and 24 months, and children between 2 and 5 years 
old with any signs of undernutrition. Two supplements—Nutrisano for children and 
Nutrivida for pregnant and lactating women—were designed specifically for Progresa 
and constituted 20 percent of daily caloric requirements and 100 percent of micronutrient 
requirements. The supplements were flavored (in banana, vanilla, chocolate, and natural 
flavors) and packaged (in small packages that only require water before consumption) in 
such a way as to ensure high levels of acceptability and intake. Mothers could pick up a 
one-month supply of the supplement for each targeted household member when they 
went to the health clinic for their own or their child’s health check-up (Skoufias 2005).  
 
Mothers were also required also attend health and nutrition lectures (called pláticas) 
(Skoufias 2005). The pláticas, conducted by physicians and nurses trained in health and 
nutrition topics, were targeted to mothers as primary caretakers of children, but were also 
open to other beneficiary family members and non-beneficiaries as well. Up to 25 themes 
were covered, including nutrition, hygiene, immunization, family planning, and the 
detection and prevention of chronic disease, but emphasis was placed on preventing 
health risks (e.g. via prenatal care, early detection of child undernutrition, immunization, 
and safe water treatment), recognizing signs and symptoms of common illnesses, and 
adopting appropriate caring behaviors (e.g. treatment of diarrhea with oral rehydration). 
The pláticas also reinforced appropriate use of the supplements as well as proper child 
feeding practices and optimal consumption during pregnancy (Behrman and Hoddinott 
2005; Skoufias 2005). Oportunidades has continued the pláticas, supplements, and 
required health visits. 
 
A randomized evaluation of Progresa from 1997 to 1999 comparing treatment and 
control groups before and after program implementation demonstrated positive results on 
service utilization and child health and nutrition. Health care utilization, measured as 
visits per day to clinics in Progresa areas compared to those in non- Progresa areas, 
increased significantly among beneficiaries by an average of 2.09 to 11.49 additional 
visits per day, depending on the regression specification used.
31 Even at the lower bound, 
                                                 
31 The estimate of 2.09 additional visits comes from a regression using a dummy to indicate whether the 
facility was located in a Progresa service area; the estimate of 11.49 additional visits comes from a 29 
 
this represents an increase in visits of approximately 18 percent to clinics in Progresa 
areas compared to control areas. This estimate refers to both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries attending Progresa clinics. In order to estimate the impact on beneficiaries 
alone, Gertler and Boyce (2001) first calculated the impact attributing the full effect to 
Progresa beneficiaries (an increase of roughly 60 percent) and then adjusted this by the 
share of beneficiary families in Progresa service areas (about 20 percent). Their 
assessment suggests that visits among beneficiary families increased twice as much as 
visits by non-beneficiary families, though both groups showed an increase (Gertler 2000; 
Gertler and Boyce 2001).   
 
Further impacts of Progresa on service utilization were noted among specific target 
groups. Growth monitoring visits increased by 30 to 60 percent among beneficiary 
children aged 0 to 2 and by 25 to 45 percent among children aged 3 to 5 (Gertler 2000).
32 
The number of pregnant women having their first prenatal check-up during the second 
and third trimesters fell and visits during the first trimester of pregnancy increased by 8 
percent (Skoufias 2005). 
 
Participation in Progresa increased mean consumption by 14.5 percent and boosted the 
value of food consumption for the median beneficiary household by 10.6 percent. The 
greatest impacts occurred among the poorest beneficiaries.
33 Overall, this translates into a 
7.8 percent higher mean caloric intake for beneficiary compared to control households. 
Beyond the increase in calories, Progresa increased dietary diversity, even after 
controlling for the income effect. By 1999, two years after the program began, 
beneficiaries consumed 16.7 percent more fruits and vegetables and 30 percent more 
animal products than control households. This suggests that the messages provided via 
the pláticas (e.g. on the importance a diverse diet), may have played a role in changing 
the eating habits of beneficiary households (Hoddinott et al. 2000).  
 
The impact of Progresa on child nutritional status has also been positive according to 
several analyses. Berhman and Hoddinott (2005) estimated the effect of Progresa on 
child height and stunting prevalence, taking into account the non-random nature of access 
to nutritional supplements: of all children 4-24 months, the intended beneficiaries of the 
supplements, only 61 to 64 percent received the supplement, whereas approximately half 
of all children 24-48 months did. One possible explanation for this is that local program 
administrators, faced with shortages of supplements and malnutrition among children 
outside of the age group intended to receive the supplement, redirected supplements to 
slightly older children who demonstrated poor nutritional status (Behrman and Hoddinott 
2005). This analysis found that Progresa brought about significant impacts among 
children 12-36 months of age who received the nutritional supplement: improvements in 
child height (a 1 to 4 percent increase) and mean z-scores (one-third of a standard 
                                                                                                                                                 
regression that did not use the dummy variable and instead included the number of families in the service 
area receiving Progresa benefits (Gertler and Boyce 2001).   
32 The range of impacts reflects different regression models, one of which includes per capita income in an 
effort to separate the transfer income effect from the impact of the nutrition and preventive care (Gertler 
2000).   
33 These are 1999 estimates, food consumption based on consumption per person per month (Hoddinott et 
al. 2000). 30 
 
deviation) as well as a reduction in the probability of being stunting (by 18 percentage 
points
34) (Gertler and Boyce 2001; Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Hoddinott 2008). The 
estimated reduction in stunting prevalence among children under-three is 7.3 percentage 
points and among children five is 6 percentage points (Hoddinott 2008). According to 
Behrman and Hoddinott (2001), an average beneficiary child (again, 12-36 months of age 
and receiving the nutritional supplement) experienced a 1.2 percent increase in height, or 
grew about one additional centimeter per year. This increase in height is estimated to 
result in a 2.9 percent increase in lifetime earnings (Behrman and Hoddinott 2001).  
 
These findings are consistent with some of the conclusions from studies by Gertler 
(2004) and Rivera et al. (2004) using data from the same time period. Gertler (2004), 
using a one-year follow-up like Behrman and Hoddinott, found that beneficiary children 
12-36 months were 0.96 centimeters taller than control children, but found no statistically 
significant impact on the odds of a child being stunted (Gertler 2004).  Because Gertler 
defined treatment as living in a locality covered by Progresa benefits, he included 
children in households not receiving Progresa benefits within the treatment group, 
suggesting that his estimates are conservative (Hoddinott 2008). Rivera et al. (2004), like 
Behrman and Hoddinott, defining treatment as living in a locality receiving Progresa 
benefits and in a Progresa-eligible household, found that after two years of exposure 
(compared to one year of exposure in the control group) children under six months of age 
from the poorest 50
th percentile were 1.1 centimeters taller than control children. No 
significant differences were noted for children older than 6 months (Rivera et al. 2004). 
 
Findings on anemia impacts have also been positive, but vary slightly according to the 
analysis. Using the same data but different sub-samples and statistical methods, Gertler 
(2004) found that a beneficiary child 12-48 months of age was 25.5 percent less likely to 
be anemic than a control child (Gertler 2004); Rivera (2004) identified that Progresa 
reduced anemia prevalence by 10.6 percentage points (44.3 vs. 54.9 percent). Children 
who had received Progresa benefits for one year (from age 0-12 months) also had a 
higher mean hemoglobin level (11.12 compared to 10.75 g/dL) than a control group of 
children who had not yet received benefits. Once the control group had been receiving 
benefits for one year (from age 12-23 months), this difference in hemoglobin levels and 
anemia rates became insignificant. Still, anemia rates remained high, at about 44 percent, 
among beneficiary children. The authors concluded that these high anemia rates were not 
a result of non-nutritional causes (such as parasitic infections like hookworm and 
malaria) because regional prevalence of these conditions is so low. Instead, they surmised 
that the persistence of anemia was due to the form of iron used in the supplement—
reduced iron—which is poorly absorbed, (Rivera et al. 2004).  
 
The Progresa-Oportunidades program offers an interesting story about the use of 
biochemical adjustments and behavior change communication to enhance the impact of 
the program’s nutritional supplement. As of September 2005, the iron format in the 
supplement was improved to enhance bioavailability and more vitamin C was added to 
facilitate iron uptake (Neufeld 2006).  
                                                 
34 Results re based on an intent-to-treat estimator with controls for child-level unobservables that account 
for (time-invariant) factors that are associated with attrition (Hoddinott 2008). 31 
 
 
Although families retrieved and consumed the supplement, its potential impact was also 
attenuated by poor compliance. Mothers often mixed the powder with more water than 
recommended, creating a thin liquid, rather than a thick substance, and used up the 
monthly ration before the month’s end. Formative research revealed that the reasons for 
this were threefold: mothers often gave the supplement more than once a day, substituted 
it for a meal, or shared a dose intended for a young child among the entire family 
(Bonvecchio et al. 2004). On average, a supplement intended for one child was often 
consumed by 2.5 family members, usually older children. Semi-structured interviews 
with mothers and program doctors revealed that intra-household sharing resulted from 
poor understanding among both beneficiaries and doctors of why the supplement was 
focused on the target age group (Neufeld 2006).  
 
In order to overcome this obstacle, a behavior change communication campaign that 
focused on four simple messages was tested. The messages, which were based on an 
understanding of mothers’ and health care providers’ perspectives on the supplements, 
promoted: 1) preparing the supplement as recommended, 2) giving the preparation every 
day, 3) offering it between breakfast and dinner, and 4) providing it only the target 
children. These messages were conveyed using a range of communication tools including 
counseling by outreach workers, in-home demonstrations of proper preparation by 
community volunteers, posters, flyers, megaphone announcements in villages, and a 
video presented to mothers in their native language in health centers. According to a 
study by Bonvecchio et al. in Veracruz and Chiapas, this intervention brought about 
significant increases in the first three behaviors in all areas, with mean increases of 42.5 
percent for preparing the supplement properly, 64.4 percent for daily provision, and 61.5 
percent for serving it between breakfast and dinner. Provision of the supplement 
exclusively to targeted children improved in Veracruz, but not Chiapas, where mothers 
expressed resistance to the idea that they should limit the supplement to certain of their 
children. The authors suggest that this constraint be addressed in future communication 
campaigns (Bonvecchio and et al. 2007). 
 
Under Oportunidades, the tasks of promotoras (now called vocals) have been further 
differentiated into four specializations: general program function, health, education, and 
nutrition. Each receives additional training in their respective topic area. The nutrition 
vocal is responsible for demonstrating proper preparation and consumption of the 
nutritional supplements, motivating beneficiaries to improve their diet and to prepare 
food hygienically, conducting home visits to follow up with households where children 
are suffering from undernutrition or health problems (Oportunidades 2007).   
 
It is likely that some of Mexico’s success derives from the wide program coverage (in 
October 2007, 98 percent of beneficiary households were receiving transfers), its large 
transfer size (representing one-fifth of per capita expenditures) and the fact that 
Progresa-Oportunidades, unlike any other CCT program, includes a nutritional 
supplement (World Bank 2008a). 32 
 
5.6 Comparing CCT Impacts  
The following figures summarize the impacts of the five CCTs on nutritional status, 
measured as mean height-for-age z-scores. Zero impacts are noted for Brazil in figures 
5.6a and 5.6b since the small negative findings by Morris (2004) were not statistically 
significant. Figure 5.6b provides a different estimate for Mexico (children 0-5 years 
rather than 1-3 years noted in 5.6a) to provide a better comparison with the CCT impacts 
in Nicaragua and Honduras; unfortunately, estimates for children 0-5 are not available 
from Colombia and Brazil. Anemia results are not shown here because only one country, 
Mexico, demonstrated impacts. 
 















































Because even the most rigorous CCT evaluations have studied the combined effects of all 
CCT components on desired outcomes (the “black box” approach), it is impossible to 
determine the degree to which individual design elements are responsible for CCT 
impacts, or the degree to which conditionality associated with each component has an 
effect. Therefore, improved nutritional status may be the result of higher-quality diets 
resulting from increased household income, enhanced knowledge among mothers 
attending nutrition education meetings, better micronutrient and caloric intake due to 
nutritional supplements, or a combination of all of these (Lagarde et al. 2007). While it 
would be invaluable to have data to disentangle these individual effects—requiring the 
comparison of multiple treatment arms (GMP, nutrition education, supplement, etc.) vs. a 
control—currently the only option to is to draw tentative lessons from the 
abovementioned program experiences. 
 
Although the five CCTs vary in terms of program design, country context (including 
baseline malnutrition rates and therefore scope for improvement), implementation 
quality, and evaluation methodologies (including time between baseline and follow-up 
studies and research design), their experiences and impacts suggest several factors that 
appear to be important to the achievement of improved nutritional status. First, the size of 
the transfer matters. Honduras, with the smallest transfer size, had no impact on 
nutritional status, despite increases in service utilization, whereas Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
Colombia, whose transfers represented at least 20 percent of average beneficiary income, 
or five times that of Honduras, had much larger impacts. Second, as in any program, 
implementation affects impact. Even when nutrition-related program features are in 
place, if the frequency or quality of counseling is poor (e.g. Brazil), group sizes in 
education sessions are large (e.g. Nicaragua), or supplement distribution is less frequent 
than expected (e.g. Nicaragua, Mexico), impacts are likely to be reduced. Similarly, if 
services are inaccessible or supply-side enhancements are incomplete (e.g. Honduras, 
Brazil), CCT incentives cannot effectively translate into better child outcomes. Third, 
coordination between CCTs and service providers (e.g. ministries and NGOs) that supply 
the services underpinning nutrition-related conditionalities is essential (e.g. the role of 
NGOs in Nicaragua), but remains a significant challenge.  
 
The CCTs in Nicaragua, Mexico, and Colombia—each with multiple nutrition-related 
conditionalities (including a micronutrient supplement in Nicaragua and a nutritional 
supplement in Mexico)—brought about the largest impacts on nutritional status, 
suggesting that a combination of nutrition-related conditionalities may contribute to 
greater nutritional impact. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the magnitude of 
impact of individual nutrition-related conditionalities on nutritional status given the data 
available.  
 
How large are these effects in relation to those observed in other kinds of nutrition 
interventions? According to three studies reviewed in a recent Lancet article on the 
effectiveness of interventions for maternal and child nutrition and survival, nutrition 
education counseling about complementary feeding without accompanying food or cash 
was estimated to improve height-for-age z-scores (HAZ) by 0.25 in food-secure 
populations (Bhutta et al 2008). This impact is slightly greater than each of the CCT 34 
 
impacts noted here, except Mexico’s (0.33 z-scores for children age 1-3 years)—which is 
different from the other programs because it provides a food supplement. However, CCTs 
tend to target populations that are food-insecure and they do provide cash, so the 
comparison may not be appropriate. Another key issue affecting the comparability of 
impacts is the initial magnitude of HAZ scores prior to the intervention. 
 
Madagascar’s Seecaline program provides one of the few sources of evidence of the 
impact of a community-based growth promotion program implemented at scale.
35 A 
recent evaluation indicates that the program increased HAZ by 0.09 and reduced 
moderate stunting (HAZ ≤ -2 standard deviations) by 3 percentage points over the seven 
years between the baseline and follow-up surveys. Both of these impacts fall below the 
CCT impacts on HAZ and stunting prevalence noted in this paper, with the exception of 
Honduras’ PRAF, which had no impact. While environmental and demographic 
conditions differ greatly between Madagascar and Latin America, interestingly, the initial 
prevalence of stunting was quite similar in Madagascar and Mexico (47.5 and 45.1 
percent in 1997, respectively); baseline stunting prevalence in treatment communities in 
Honduras (52 percent among beneficiaries receiving the demand-side intervention) and 
Nicaragua (41.9 percent) were also within close range (Hoddinott 2008). In Madagascar, 
the relatively better-off and more educated households were better able to translate 
Seecaline’s behavioral messages into gains in nutritional status, suggesting that monetary 
support, such as a cash transfer, could enhance the impact of programs like Seecaline 
(Galasso and Umapathi 2007; World Bank 2008a).  
 
Most studies of micronutrient interventions highlight impacts on micronutrient status and 
other specific conditions, like anemia and goiter, rather than child growth. Zinc is one 
exception. A meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials looking at the effect of zinc 
supplementation on the growth of prepubertal children found an overall effect on HAZ of 
0.35 (Brown et al. 2002). The effect was greater for children older than 6 months with 
low initial height-for-age z-scores. A more recent analysis of 40 studies limited to 
children under five found an overall effect of 0.07 z-scores (Horton et al. 2008). These 
mixed findings make it difficult to compare the impact on growth of zinc 
supplementation versus that of CCTs; however, it seems logical that a CCT including 
zinc supplementation would have a greater effect than either intervention alone.  
 
In sum, CCT impacts on nutrition fall within the range of several other nutrition 
interventions. Still, given the fact that they include an income transfer, and require 
participation in specific activities, it is reasonable to think that CCTs that are designed to 
focus on nutrition and well implemented could have an even greater effect on 
undernutrition. Of course, a critical pending issue, which has so far been insufficiently 
explored, is that of cost-effectiveness. Even if CCTs can have a greater impact on child 
nutrition, they must be able to do so in a cost-effective manner. 
 
                                                 
35 Seecaline provides nutrition and hygiene education sessions, cooking demonstrations, and counseling 
about complementary feeding (Galasso and Umapathi 2007). 35 
 
6. Applying Best Practices in Nutrition to CCTs  
Some valuable lessons about improving CCT impacts on nutrition emerge directly from 
CCT experience, but there is also much to be learned from best practices in nutrition 
interventions. These practices could be incorporated as conditionalities or considered 
more broadly as complementary interventions in areas covered by CCTs if conditionality 
is not deemed appropriate, necessary, or feasible (see section 8.2).  
6.1 Growth Monitoring and Promotion  
There has been some confusion about the basic objectives of monitoring and promoting 
child growth and the terminology used to describe it. Box 6.1 lists several definitions 
used in this paper. Growth monitoring (and promotion) can be conducted in a health 
facility (e.g. CCTs in Brazil and Colombia) or at the community level (e.g. CCTs in 
Nicaragua and Honduras). 
 
Box 6.1 Definitions 
•  Growth monitoring (GM): periodic weighing
36 of a child and use of the child’s 
growth trajectory compared to the WHO international growth standard to 
determine adequacy of growth.  
•  Growth monitoring and promotion (GMP): growth monitoring tied to pre-
defined activities to promote child growth (e.g. counseling).  
•  Community-based growth promotion (CBGP): periodic child measurement 
used both to assess growth and as a decision-making tool to tailor 
recommendations to mothers about actions that could promote child growth 
(e.g. counseling on caring practices and home medical visits). 
Source: Griffiths and Del Rosso 2007 
 
It is widely recognized that growth monitoring alone does not change a child’s growth 
and therefore tailored behavior change counseling is the cornerstone of an effective 
approach. Indeed, evidence from large programs in Bangladesh (BRAC and BINP) and 
India (ICDS) indicates that growth monitoring that is accompanied by poor nutrition 
counseling has little or no effect on nutritional status. However, according to a review of 
evidence in Jamaica, Nigeria, India,
37 Tanzania, Madagascar, and Senegal, children 
whose growth was monitored and whose caregiver received nutrition and health 
education experienced improved nutritional status and higher survival rates compared to 
children who did not receive these services. Tentative evidence from a large-scale 
program in Brazil confirms these results (Ashworth 2007). According to a recent 
evaluation of Madagascar’s Seecaline (mentioned above), the intervention had a 
protective effect on beneficiaries, preventing increases in stunting despite a higher 
incidence of shocks and food insecurity among the beneficiary households compared to 
                                                 
36 Even when stunting is a primary concern, generally weight gain, rather than height, is the preferred 
indicator because it is considered the most sensitive indicator of growth and can be more accurately 
measured at shorter intervals, thereby allowing for greater potential for intervention and prevention 
(Marini et al. 2008).  
37 TINP and small programs in Narangwal and Jamkhed. 36 
 
control households. The evaluation, while not randomized, employed a rigorous quasi-
experimental matching design (Galasso and Umapathi 2007).  
 
This evidence suggests that CCTs that condition only on collecting child weights are 
unlikely to have a significant impact on child nutritional status and that instead CCT 
programs should only consider a growth monitoring conditionality if quality counseling 
tailored to the child’s circumstances (e.g. adequacy of weight gain,
 38 health status, food 
intake, and caring practices), sufficient training and supervision of staff and volunteers, 
and links to the health sector can be ensured. Quality assurance could be achieved 
through improved program monitoring to ensure that these essential program activities 
are taking place, or as mentioned above in the discussion of Nicaragua’s CCT, via 
incentives to service providers that supply high-quality, well-tailored counseling and 
home visits. 
 
Growth promotion should focus on children under two years of age, or as some experts 
suggest, on children under 12 months of age (but up to 18 months in cases of growth 
faltering) (Ashworth 2007). Because of growth patterns in young children, it is 
appropriate to monitor weight on a monthly basis for children under 12 months and on a 
semimonthly basis for children from 13-24 months (Marini et al. 2008). CCT 
conditionalities could reflect these best practices by limiting their coverage to children 
under two (so, for example, Colombia’s CCT would apply the growth monitoring 
conditionality to children 0-2 rather than 0-7) and by requiring monthly attention until 12 
months and semimonthly attention during the following year. This would require an 
effective communication mechanism to ensure that mothers understood the change in 
frequency for their child, but could ultimately reduce the transaction costs associated with 
this requirement since the overall number of growth monitoring and promotion visits 
would be reduced in the second year. Further testing of this approach should be 
conducted, particularly in a CCT context. 
 
Many community-based growth promotion programs aggregate and visually present 
results of child growth at monthly community meetings to inform all community 
members about child growth trends and to involve everyone in the process of supporting 
healthy children (Griffiths et al. 1996; Marini et al. 2008). If participation rates in these 
community gatherings are low, attendance could be another option for conditionality.   
6.2 Behavior Change Communication for Nutrition  
Fundamental to nutrition behavioral change is the notion that small, but important 
changes in child caring and feeding practices and maternal nutrition—all of which require 
minimal food or resource investments—can have a significant impact on child nutrition 
and can do so in a reasonable time period. A study of BCC for child nutrition in Bihar, 
India found that improved hand-washing practices (e.g. after mother’s defecation, after 
helping a child defecate, or before preparing food) were associated with improved 
nutritional status. Also in Bihar, teaching mothers to continue breastfeeding during 
                                                 
38 Many programs utilize a decision-tree, or algorithm, to help the counselor determine which messages are 
appropriate for a specific situation. Counselors also often use a series of counseling cards with 
illustrations that facilitate the communication of new practices to parents (Marini et al. 2008). 37 
 
diarrheal episodes—to counter the common practice of stopping breastfeeding, as many 
women do for fear of causing continued diarrhea—contributed to quicker recovery and 
lower incidence of severe illness (Levinson et al. 2007). Evidence from Indonesia, the 
Dominican Republic, and Brazil indicates that changes in complementary feeding 
practices can take place within a relatively short period of time, if proper support and 
reinforcement of messages is provided (Allen and Gillespie 2001; Flavin and Griffiths 
1999).  
 
Given the importance of carefully crafted messages and their regular reinforcement, it is 
worthwhile to consider ways to improve the focus of nutrition messages for appropriate 
audiences and to better target key messages. The target group for CCT group education 
and counseling has thus far been mothers with small children. Because mothers are 
usually the primary caretakers this is a natural choice. However, men can also play an 
important role in childrearing and if they are exposed to messages about their 
responsibility for women’s and children’s nutrition, they can both change their own 
behaviors and support the behavior change of their wives. The Joint Nutrition Programme 
in Iringa, Tanzania developed methods for increasing father’s support for changing 
feeding practices (Engle et al. 2000). In West Africa, a BASICS program found that 
agricultural extension workers who were provided with nutrition education materials 
were successful in transmitting nutrition messages to men. Men who had been exposed to 
nutrition messages, either via extension agents, posters, or radio messages, were twice as 
likely to bring home the healthy foods that were promoted by the nutrition messages than 
men who were not exposed (Parlato and Seidel 1998). In practice, a CCT conditionality 
requiring that men participate in educational sessions could prove to be too time-
consuming or socially undesirable for some families; however, this has not been tried in 
any CCT, so it is unclear what the true constraints would be in different contexts. A 
middle ground solution could be for the CCT to provide specific education workshops, 
designed exclusively for fathers and held less frequently. It may be beneficial to have a 
trained male doctor, nurse, or teacher, who is also a parent, facilitate workshops targeting 
fathers, so that he could share experiences and relate well to the audience.  
 
Additionally, group education workshops could be segmented, with separate sessions for 
mothers of each child age group, so that messages would reach mothers at what is likely 
to be the most appropriate learning moment. Age-specific messages were tested in a 
study in Haiti comparing a preventive versus a recuperative nutrition intervention, both 
with food supplements and behavior change communication.
39 The preventive approach, 
with longer duration of BCC and age-specific messages, resulted in improved nutritional 
status and slightly better maternal knowledge of infant and child feeding and general 
health and nutrition practices, as well as greater likelihood of awareness, trial, and 
adoption of new practices (particularly diet diversity and consumption of animal source 
foods). However, because the food component made the greatest contribution to the 
                                                 
39 The preventive approach targeted all children age 6-24 months with 18 months of food rations and a 
maximum of 18 monthly age-specific behavior change sessions, while the recuperative approach targeted 
children under five who were malnourished with 9 months of food rations and 9 monthly standard BCC 
sessions. 38 
 
outcomes in this study, it would be useful to test the effectiveness of age-specific BCC 
messages separately to corroborate this finding (Menon and Ruel 2007). 
 
In practice, more frequent and varied workshops would pose organizational challenges 
and greater personnel needs for CCTs. One response to this could be to call on CCT 
beneficiaries to support audience segmentation by having some or all beneficiaries, after 
going through the series of trainings with their own child, take a turn helping a trained 
facilitator or local volunteer (e.g. promotora) for one workshop. This beneficiary mother 
could provide examples of behaviors that were difficult to change and what she did to 
overcome, or try to overcome, these obstacles. In addition to motivating other mothers, 
this experience could help empower her and reinforce her newly gained knowledge and 
skills. This has not yet been tested in a CCT program and would require attention to 
women’s time constraints. 
 
To further reinforce messages, existing materials that have proven effective in nutrition 
programming could be used to support nutrition behavior change efforts within CCT 
programs. For example, Indonesia’s Nutrition Communication and Behavior Change 
Project used an “action poster,” similar to a wall calendar, for each of the principal target 
age groups. This innovation allowed for the presentation of tailored messages to 
individual mothers at key periods in their children’s development (Manoff Group 2007). 
Something similar could be provided to CCT beneficiaries, perhaps delivered with cash 
or during healthcare visits, and used as the foundation of the nutrition counseling 
curriculum. 
6.3 Micronutrient Interventions 
Recommended micronutrient interventions for children include vitamin A 
supplementation (for women up to eight weeks postpartum and children 6-72 months);
40 
universal provision of iodized salt; iron supplements in areas where malaria is not 
endemic;
41 and therapeutic zinc supplementation to treat diarrhea.
42  
 
Several CCTs have included iron supplementation for young children with mixed results 
on anemia. While problems with supplement delivery and compliance likely contributed 
to the low or negligible impacts, another possible explanation is that poor diet and 
deficiencies in other micronutrients, specifically vitamin B-12, limited the hematological 
response to iron supplementation. In a study of iron supplementation and anemia in 
Guatemala, Allen et al. (2000) found that children who consumed more animal products 
(characterized by absorbable iron, riboflavin, vitamin B-12, and vitamin A), had better 
                                                 
40 Vitamin A supplementation for children 6-72 months is estimated to reduce under-three mortality by 23 
percent. Neonatal vitamin A supplementation is also being used in some places, but positive effects on 
mortality have only been shown in Asia (Horton et al. 2008; Bhutta et al. 2008).  
41 Because iron can have adverse effects on malaria, untargeted supplementation is recommended only in 
areas where malaria is not endemic (Bhutta et al. 2008). 
42 For children 12-59 months, zinc supplementation has been shown to reduce diarrhea severity and 
duration as well as stunting and mortality (Bhutta et al. 2008; Allen and Gillespie 2001; Grantham-
McGregor and Ani 2001). There have been some positive results associated with preventive zinc 
treatment (on growth, morbidity and mortality), but little evidence from programs operating at scale 
(Horton et al. 2008). 39 
 
hemoglobin response than children who ate predominantly plant-based foods (in which 
phytates and fiber limit mineral bioavailability). Children with higher initial levels of 
vitamin B-12 were also more likely to experience increased hemoglobin associated with 
iron supplementation (Allen et al. 2000). This suggests that CCTs providing iron 
supplements should ensure that counseling on dietary intake, especially animal-source 
foods, and possibly additional vitamin supplements are also provided to beneficiaries, 
whether as part of program conditionalities (e.g. required attendance at individualized 
counseling) or by health center staff separately. 
 
Because child nutritional status is directly affected by maternal nutrition, supplements for 
pregnant women can improve child outcomes as well. Receipt of maternal supplements 
could act as an additional conditionality for CCT beneficiaries in places where maternal 
micronutrient deficiency rates are high, dietary diversity is poor, and baseline 
supplementation rates are low. Supplementation of pregnant women with iron and folate 
has been shown to increase hemoglobin status and reduce the risk of anemia.
43 However, 
when diets are poor, multiple micronutrient deficiencies often occur simultaneously and 
deficiencies in micronutrients other than iron (such as B vitamins, iodine, vitamin D, and 
antioxidants) can cause poor pregnancy outcomes (Allen 2004). In the absence of 
sufficient improvements in dietary quality, supplementation with multiple micronutrients 
during pregnancy can be a promising option. A systematic review and meta-analysis by 
Bhutta et al. (2008) found that pregnancy supplementation with three or more 
micronutrients was associated with a 39 percent reduction in maternal anemia compared 
to either two or more micronutrients or a placebo (Bhutta et al. 2008). A caveat is 
important here: although supplementation with multiple micronutrients is theoretically 
preferable to iron-folate supplementation in areas with various micronutrient deficiencies, 
several studies have indicated that existing analyses have not established the added 
benefits of multiple micronutrient supplements compared to iron-folate supplementation. 
These studies also conclude that there is insufficient evidence to identify potential 
adverse effects of supplementation and to determine whether excess supplementation 
during pregnancy is harmful to the mother or the fetus (Allen 2004; Ramakrishnan et al. 
2004; Haider and Bhutta 2006).  
 
In cases of marked food insecurity, maternal supplements of balanced energy and protein 
(as in Mexico) may also be beneficial and could be provided via a CCT. According to a 
review of 13 studies, Bhutta et al. (2008) found that balanced supplements of energy and 
protein for pregnant women reduced the risk of intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR), 
which is a strong predictor of size later in life—most infants born with IUGR do not fully 
catch up to normal size during childhood—by 32 percent (Allen and Gillespie 2001; 
Bhutta et al. 2008). Note that these effects were dominated by a large study in the 
Gambia on pregnant women with low body-mass index (BMI) and receiving a 
supplement of 700kcal per day. These findings suggest that further experimentation with 
nutritional supplements in CCT programs for children and pregnant women with low 
BMI could be valuable.  
                                                 
43 For example, a pooled analysis of 8 studies found that iron-folate supplementation during pregnancy 
increased hemoglobin levels at term by 12 g/L and reduced the risk of anemia at term by 73 percent 
(Bhutta et al. 2008). 40 
 
 
Home fortification with dispersible micronutrient preparations, such as Sprinkles—which 
contain iron, zinc, iodine, folic acid, and vitamins C, D, and A—can improve 
micronutrient (especially iron) intake for young children, while also promoting 
complementary feeding. In these powdered supplements, the iron is encapsulated in a thin 
layer of lipids to prevent any distasteful interaction that would alter the flavor, color, or 
texture of the food to which powder is added. Efficacy and effectiveness studies provide 
evidence that the consumption of dispersible micronutrient preparations can improve iron 
status significantly, especially among young, anemic children (Zlotkin et al. 2004; Menon 
et al. 2007; Bhutta et al. 2008).
44  
 
The provision of dispersible micronutrient preparations is a promising strategy for several 
reasons. First, their acceptability has been quite high among mothers, children and 
communities. Second, they provide beneficiaries with the full daily micronutrient 
requirements. And third, because they are administered via complementary foods, 
targeting the supplement to children 6-24 months effectively promotes the appropriate 
introduction of complementary foods (Zlotkin 2004). Sprinkles are being used at scale in 
Bangladesh, Mexico, and Mongolia (Zlotkin et al. 2005). The positive impacts noted in 
several studies suggest that broader experimentation merits additional attention and 
resources.  
 
In addition to experimenting with different types of micronutrients, CCTs could also 
apply promising approaches to overcoming supply-side concerns—e.g. logistics 
associated with delivery, quality control, storage, and the costs associated with these—
and lack of beneficiary compliance. Ongoing community-based programs with active 
community workers have been successful in increasing rates of participation in 
supplementation programs considerably. In Bangladesh, when community nutrition 
promoters were trained and permitted to distribute iron-folate supplements to pregnant 
women themselves—earlier, pregnant women needed to travel to the nearest health clinic 
or await the uncertain arrival of a satellite clinic—the effect on iron-folate intake during 
pregnancy increased dramatically from 16.6 percent at baseline to 83.9 percent at end line 
six years later (Lutter 2007). 
 
The provision of accompanying counseling and information (e.g. via radio, posters, etc.) 
clearly explaining the benefits and intake guidelines for each supplement could reduce 
problems of compliance, as seen in Mexico. Additionally, the CCT community volunteer 
could be trained in compliance issues (as are the Oportunidades promotoras) and could 
                                                 
44 According to efficacy studies in eight countries, on average, the reduction in anemia ranges between 55 
and 90 percent depending on the presence or absence of malaria (Zlotkin et al. 2004). The only 
effectiveness study in children 6-24 months in Haiti indicated an improvement in levels of hemoglobin 
and a reduction in anemia. Among children who received two months of the Sprinkles supplement along 
with a food ration (WSB), anemia prevalence (adjusted for baseline prevalence, age, and sex) fell by 39.4 
percentage points (from 53.7 percent at baseline to 14.3 percent 7 months later) and recovery from 
anemia was twice as high as in the non-Sprinkles group. At the seven-month follow-up, children who had 
received Sprinkles had mean adjusted hemoglobin levels of 10.9 g/dL higher than baseline. Younger 
children and those who were anemic when they began to consume Sprinkles benefited more from the 
supplement (Menon et al. 2007).  41 
 
act as another voice to motivate mothers to prepare and administer supplements 
appropriately and limit their provision to the specified beneficiary.  
 
Beyond supplementation, another promising strategy to reduce anemia is delayed 
umbilical cord clamping. Recent studies have highlighted the importance of delayed 
umbilical cord clamping to increase infant iron status. If the doctor or midwife waits one 
to two minutes, instead of cutting the cord immediately after delivery, the infant’s blood 
volume increases by roughly 50 percent. This increase provides 75 mg of iron, 
representing 33 percent increase in the infant’s total body iron (Dewey 2006). According 
to three studies of delayed umbilical cord clamping, the risk of anemia was reduced by 80 
percent 24 to 48 hours after birth (in one study) and by 47 percent at 2 to 3 months after 
birth (in two studies) (Bhutta et al. 2008). Agencies involved in CCT planning could 
coordinate with the Ministry of Health to ensure that delayed umbilical cord clamping is 
taught and practiced in clinics where CCTs are implemented so that beneficiaries would 
benefit from this practice. If necessary, a clinic incentive could be arranged to reward 
service providers that used delayed umbilical cord clamping in institutionalized births 
and this could be verified via spot checks and reports. (See section 8.3 below for more 
commentary on supply-side incentives). 
 
7. New and Redesigned CCTs Focusing on Nutrition 
There are several new CCT programs with significant attention to nutrition currently in 
the design or early implementation stages. The examples below highlight some exciting 
and innovative developments in CCT design and suggest the possibility of a closer 
marriage of CCTs and nutrition policy in the future.  
7.1 Panama 
Panama launched a new CCT program called the Red de Oportunidades in early 2006. To 
accompany the cash transfer and its conditionalities (in education, health, and legal 
identification of beneficiaries), the Government of Panama, with support from the World 
Bank, is implementing a component to strengthen and expand the basic package of health 
services called PAISS (Paquete de Atención Integral de Servicios de Salud) to meet the 
demand generated by the CCT. This effort involves the provision of funds and technical 
assistance to bolster PAISS with a community-based growth promotion and development 
intervention aimed at preventing chronic undernutrition (known as PAISS+N). The 
Department of Nutrition, the Ministry of Health, and local and international experts will 
standardize growth promotion protocols, and develop plans to ensure high quality 
counseling appropriate for indigenous communities,
45 and incorporate these efforts into 
PAISS services. PAISS+N will then be expanded to CCT areas, including some areas 
concurrently covered by PAISS without its nutrition elements. Training and software will 
be provided to central and regional Ministry of Health staff to build institutional capacity 
to plan, coordinate, and supervise activities associated with PAISS+N. A monitoring and 
                                                 
45 Indigenous beneficiaries represent one-third of all Red de Oportunidades beneficiaries (World Bank 
2007a). 42 
 
evaluation system is also being planned to track the expansion of PAISS+N and measure 
the impact of the additional preventive nutrition interventions (World Bank 2007a).  
7.2 Peru 
Peru is making great strides to transform its CCT, Juntos, which previously demonstrated 
minimal success, into an integral part of its national nutrition strategy. In its initial form, 
Juntos provided a flat transfer worth $30 per month (representing roughly 25 percent of 
the consumption of beneficiary households) to families that met conditionalities in 
primary education and health. The arrangements for verifying compliance were 
problematic: beneficiaries had to personally collect certification from schools and health 
posts to prove their attendance, and this interfered with service provision and created an 
unnecessary emphasis on filling in forms, rather than using and providing services. 
Furthermore, although roughly thirty percent of the Juntos budget was allocated to the 
health and education sector as fungible resources to strengthen the supply of relevant 
services, little of this money was spent, and services did not appreciably improve (Tesluic 
and Walker 2007).  
 
Thanks to strong political commitment to nutrition at the national level—President 
Garcia committed to reducing chronic undernutrition by five percentage points in five 
years, at the beginning of his term—the Peruvian government, with technical assistance 
from the World Bank, has been planning an important re-orientation of Juntos in order to 
maximize its impact on nutrition outcomes. In July 2007 the board of Juntos decided to 
refocus on improving nutritional outcomes. Soon after, this initiative was endorsed by the 
national nutrition strategy, CRECER (Tesluic and Walker 2007).  Recommendations 
made by a World Bank team include: (1) adjusting the targeting algorithm that 
determines district eligibility to increase the weight given to chronic undernutrition at the 
community level—but not, as programs in the past have done, targeting individuals who 
are malnourished, which can create a perverse incentive; (2) eliminating conditionalities 
that seem extraneous or counterproductive and emphasizing essential conditionalities 
related to nutrition outcomes, based on agreement between the Ministry of Health and the 
government—these include growth monitoring and promotion (initially required every 
four months, but more frequently as capacity and demand increase
46) and micronutrient 
supplementation; (3) utilizing a new supply-side financing mechanism that would 
establish priorities and criteria for spending funds dedicated to supply-enhancement and 
condition supply-side transfers on the provision of a minimal level of coverage; and (4) 
revising the compliance verification mechanism such that information systems used by 
Juntos and the Ministry of Health will be harmonized and institutional coordination and 
impact evaluation capacity will be strengthened (World Bank 2007b).  
 
The impact of these reforms is expected to be considerable. Already 40 percent of the 
500,000 children under-five who are chronically undernourished live in Juntos areas. In 
these areas, almost 36 percent of children under five suffer from chronic undernutrition, 
compared to only 13 percent in non-Juntos areas. Halving undernutrition in Juntos areas 
                                                 
46 The World Bank recently produced a video that presents simple standards for children’s growth during 
the first two years in an effort to inform parents about expected growth and motivate them to demand 
services that promote healthy growth (World Bank 2007b).  43 
 
would reduce the national rate of undernutrition by 20 percent (Tesluic and Walker 
2007).  
7.3 Bolivia 
Bolivia is in the process of designing a CCT to combat chronic child undernutrition, 
targeted to families with pregnant women and/or mothers of children younger than two. 
Communities with high rates of chronic undernutrition and poverty are being selected to 
receive cash transfers, a public information campaign (with information about program 
objectives and benefits), and supply-side improvements (e.g. strengthened Ministry of 
Health technical services and improved monitoring and accountability mechanisms). A 
pilot in 10 municipalities was planned for early 2008, followed by full expansion in 2009 
(World Bank 2008b).  
 
8.  Key Issues Affecting CCT Impact on Child Undernutrition  
8.1 Eligibility and Benefit Duration 
As mentioned in the cases of Peru and Bolivia, introducing a nutrition focus to a CCT 
implies different approaches to determining program eligibility and defining the 
appropriate duration of CCT benefits. Because poverty is often highly correlated with 
undernutrition—the prevalence of undernutrition is often two or three times higher 
among the poorest income quintile than the highest quintile—and because CCTs have 
been found to be well targeted to the poor, malnourished individuals are also likely 
reached by CCTs (World Bank 2006a). As mentioned above, Peru’s Juntos program is 
considering adjusting its targeting algorithm to more heavily weight chronic 
undernutrition at the community level. Although this may be relevant where high rates of 
undernutrition are concentrated in particular regions (e.g. Peru and Panama), it is not 
likely to be necessary in most cases.  
 
Within the target area, defining eligibility more narrowly to cover the “window of 
opportunity” for nutrition interventions—pregnancy through the first two years of life—
can enhance the ability of CCTs to prevent stunting. In Bolivia’s CCT, which focuses 
specifically on nutrition, eligibility extends from pregnancy (“minus-nine”) through age-
two. A nutrition-focused CCT could, for example, employ a conditionality requiring 
attendance at growth promotion sessions on a monthly basis for children 0-12 months and 
once every two months for children 12-18 months, and then provide Sprinkles for 
children 6-24 months and other micronutrient supplements for pre-school children (i.e. 
iron-deficiency can affect learning, work performance, and productivity at all stages of 
life). CCTs that focus on nutrition as well as other types of human capital formation 
could employ conditionalities that address stunting until age two and continue 
micronutrient and health conditionalities through the preschool period to ensure that pre-
school children receive necessary services (e.g. immunizations, de-worming, and oral 
rehydration therapy). 44 
 
8.2 Conditionality 
There has been considerable debate about the importance of conditionality to gains in 
health and nutritional status. While two studies have found positive impacts of 
conditionality on school enrollment (de Brauw and Hoddinott 2008 and Schady and 
Araujo 2006), there is as yet little evidence regarding the impact on nutrition and health 
outcomes. However, several examples suggest that conditionality may make a difference. 
According to an evaluation of Jamaica’s CCT (PATH), 46 percent of the families 
reporting that their children’s use of healthcare had increased since the program began 
attributed this change to the CCT (Levy and Ohls 2007). Also, experiences from 
contingency management
47 interventions, which seek to change complex, entrenched 
behaviors (usually related to substance abuse, smoking, and overeating) via positive 
reinforcement (often in the form of financial incentives or other rewards such as vouchers 
and prizes), have shown some positive results (Medlin and de Walque 2008).
48 Although 
these types of behavior change are quite different from those targeted by CCTs, the 
results suggest that conditionality can be useful in modifying behavioral patterns that are 
deep-rooted and difficult to change. 
 
When considering if and how to attach nutrition-related conditionalities to a cash transfer 
program in an area where child undernutrition is a problem (and is not caused by lack of 
food alone), it may be helpful to use a simplified decision rule (illustrated in Box 8.2). 
This decision rule distinguishes among four scenarios: First, where nutrition programs 
exist and are well used (defined according to criteria of frequency and regularity) and 
effective, conditionality is unnecessary and an unconditional transfer (UCT) is a better 
option. Second, where nutrition programs exist, are of good quality, but are underutilized, 
nutrition-related conditionalities can be considered as a possible tool to spur participation. 
Third, where nutrition programs exist, are underutilized, and are of poor quality, a CCT 
coupled with supply-side improvements can be considered. And fourth, where no 
nutrition program exists, a nutrition-focused CCT is not appropriate unless high-quality 
and accessible services can be introduced and it is determined that these services would 
be underutilized without cash incentives and conditionalities. Decisions about 
conditionality should also take into account political economy issues—the willingness of 
elites to support transfer programs to the poor, costs associated with verifying 
compliance—particularly if there are multiple conditionalities, each with their own 
verification mechanism, and the degree of existing administrative capacity. Finally, the 
cost-effectiveness of different design options, addressed in more detail in section 8.4, 
should be considered. 
                                                 
47 Like CCTs, contingency management “relies on the mechanism of conditionality to elicit behaviors that 
are viewed to be in one’s long-term interests (or, in those of society’s) and to discourage those behaviors 
that may ultimately be detrimental to one’s own health and well-being that may not be easily perceived or 
experienced in the short-term.” Unlike traditional CCTs, contingency management focuses exclusively on 
complex, deeply ingrained behaviors that require more than just simple actions, such as attending school 
or health clinics (Medlin and de Walque 2008). 
48 Positive results have been noted for cocaine and alcohol abuse. One limitation to these findings is that 
many clinical trials of the contingency management approach have been conducted in developed 
countries, with small sample sizes, and have shown mixed results (Medlin and de Walque 2008). 45 
 
 





In order to make appropriate decisions about the use of CCTs for nutrition objectives, an 
assessment of existing nutrition programs and their utilization should be undertaken to 
determine the quality of services and usage patterns by potential beneficiaries. Formative 
research, using focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with community 
members and service providers, can allow program planners to understand the 
preferences and perceptions of potential CCT beneficiaries as well as the constraints they 
face. Furthermore, by identifying specific obstacles to services use (e.g. cost, distance, 
quality, or other factors) this process can spur ideas for appropriate interventions to best 
overcome these constraints. 
 
At this point it is also valuable to think about other approaches, besides conditionalities, 
that could achieve the same results. For example, moral suasion through a public 
education campaign conveying messages about how to spend cash transfers, or notional 
earmarking might be just as effective as a CCT in boosting the consumption of nutritious 
foods (World Bank 2008a). In cases where such alternatives seem unlikely to bring about 
desired outcomes, or have been proven not to do so, conditionality can be a feasible 
design option. 
 
It is, of course, critical to select the “right” conditionalities. Factors like geography, the 
burden of disease, and the degree of existing infrastructure and social services can shape 
the menu of suitable nutrition-related conditionalities. For example, iron supplementation 
is most suitable in areas with high anemia prevalence (over 40 percent), high diarrhea 
prevalence (often sites with poor sanitation), and poor growing conditions (high altitude, 
poor soil, etc.) or poor market access, because it is likely that iron-rich foods will be less 
Nutrition programs: in place, 
good quality, well-utilized  Use a UCT; conditionality is unnecessary 
Nutrition programs: in place, 
good quality, not well-utilized  Consider a CCT to boost participation 
Nutrition programs: in place, 
poor quality, not well-utilized  Consider a CCT + supply-side improvement 
No nutrition program in place 
Consider a CCT if: 
a)  high-quality services can be introduced 
and 
b)  it can be determined that these services 
would be underutilized 46 
 
available in such places (Allen and Gillespie 2001). CCTs in areas with these 
characteristics (but not endemic malaria) and insufficient iron supplementation coverage 
could consider employing a conditionality involving iron supplementation. Where 
hygiene and sanitation are major concerns, CCTs could prioritize conditionalities 
attached to counseling about hygiene practices and investments in sanitation 
infrastructure. And, in areas where complementary feeding practices are poor, an 
intervention that stresses counseling on feeding and its relationship to healthy growth, 
perhaps accompanied by dispersible micronutrient preparations, may be the most relevant 
nutrition conditionality. Costs may also be more easily justified in contexts where 
conditionalities meet visible needs (Medlin and de Walque 2008). 
 
Decisions about appropriate conditionalities should also draw on evidence about which 
nutrition interventions have the strongest link to desired outcomes in the particular 
context. As mentioned in the discussion above about Juntos in Peru, conditionalities that 
are extraneous or counterproductive should be replaced with more appropriate 
conditionalities that will spur participation in activities that have the greatest likelihood of 
impact. New conditionalities could also be introduced, such as interventions to boost the 
nutritional status of pregnant women (e.g. pregnancy weight gain monitoring with 
accompanying counseling about dietary intake during pregnancy) and/or improved 
micronutrient supplements for pregnant and lactating women and children (e.g. multi-
micronutrient supplements, dispersible micronutrient preparations, zinc, and B12). 
Because nutrition and health deficits among young children in developing countries are 
often accompanied by weak motor skills and poor cognitive and socio-emotional 
development, it may also be useful to institute a CCT conditionality that included 
counseling and services for early child development (ECD) (Schady 2006b). 
 
There are different ways of applying conditionalities. The vast majority of CCTs focus on 
conditionalities at the individual or household level. However, the same approach could 
be applied at the community level with target rates of participation in specified activities 
(e.g. CBGP, immunizations, or institutionalized births) required in order for households 
to receive individual transfers. Alternatively, these accomplishments could trigger an 
additional incentive payment made to individuals or to the community. For example, 
communities (or individuals within communities) that maintained a given participation 
rate in CBGP, or achieved a specified reduction in stunting prevalence over the course of 
a year, could be eligible for a supplementary transfer on top of their monthly benefits. 
This approach could introduce a free-rider problem and would require mechanisms for 
internal and external assessment. 
 
However, community-level conditionalities may be able to introduce a positive peer 
pressure effect and inspire collective responsibility for nutrition results within 
communities. A recent systematic review of randomized controlled trials of obesity 
reduction efforts using the contingency management approach found that incentives 
based on group performance had better results than those based on individual 
performance (Medlin and de Walque 2008). Currently community-level conditionalities 
are being implemented in the Indonesia pilot CCT and planned pilots in Tanzania and 
Sierra Leone also intend to try community-based conditionalities (Grosh, personal 47 
 
communication 2008). If they replaced individual-level conditionalities or were applied 
to what were previously unconditional cash transfers, community-level conditionalities 
could also reduce the administrative demands of verifying individual-level compliance. 
 
Finally, different methods of verifying compliance can be selected. Most commonly seen 
are “hard” conditionalities, which are both verified and enforced.
49 However, where 
administrative capacity is limited and funding is scarce, “soft” conditionalities, in which 
specific actions are recommended, but not enforced, may be more appropriate. 
Temporary soft conditionality is also an option while verification and enforcement 
systems are being put in place (Adato and Bassett 2008; World Bank 2008a). 
8.3 Supply-side Investments 
As is evident in the case of PRAF in Honduras and Juntos in Peru, the lack of meaningful 
investment in the supply of services, even when funding is allocated, can jeopardize CCT 
effectiveness. Despite some examples of successful supply enhancement efforts—
Nicaragua’s use of NGOs boosted supply effectively, and El Salvador’s basic services 
branch of the Red Solidaria indicates commitment to boosting supply to meet increased 
demand, although results have yet to be confirmed—progress on this front is critical, 
especially as CCTs spread to new countries and regions with less developed service 
infrastructure.  
 
One approach to improving services via a CCT is to establish clear priorities and criteria 
for how to spend allocated funds in consultation with relevant ministries (as in Peru), and 
to monitor spending carefully. Another approach is to offer an incentive to service 
providers for improved service provision. An incentive like Nicaragua’s school supply 
bonus—a small payment to teachers who faced some additional reporting duties and were 
likely to have larger classes after the introduction of the CCT—could be employed to 
improve the supply and quality of nutrition services. For example, applying this concept 
to community-based growth promotion (CBGP), each participating CCT mother could be 
awarded a “CBGP bonus” which she would remit to CBGP staff at weighing sessions 
(with some specified frequency) as part of CCT compliance. Half of the bonus could act 
as an incentive for the CBGP volunteer, while the other half would go to upkeep of the 
weighing location or purchase of materials or services that would improve the quality of 
services. This model does have some risks. In places where only some community 
members are CCT beneficiaries (e.g. if targeting is based on means tests within 
communities), this kind of bonus could introduce perverse incentives for the CBGP 
volunteers who might focus more attention on mothers who are CCT beneficiaries 
because they bring incentive payment and less on mothers who are non-beneficiaries. 
Moreover, there would be additional costs associated with adding a separate payment, 
communicating its function, and monitoring its remittance and use.  
 
Alternatively, a bonus could be provided to health centers that provided a minimal level 
of service coverage and quality, and/or those that incorporated important practices related 
                                                 
49 Enforcement measures include reducing the transfer for the period of non-compliance and terminating 
payment in cases of repeated non-compliance. Some programs include outreach to families that do not 
comply to help them identify and overcome obstacles to participation (World Bank 2008a). 48 
 
to nutritional outcomes (e.g. one-on-one counseling to pregnant women during prenatal 
check-ups or young child visits, or delayed umbilical cord clamping). This approach has 
been recommended in Peru, but no results are available yet. 
8.4 Cost and Cost-effectiveness 
The cost-effectiveness of using CCTs as a mechanism to increase participation in 
nutrition interventions is another important consideration. In general, the costs of 
nutrition interventions are quite low. For example, maternal iron supplements cost 
roughly three dollars per pregnancy plus cost of counseling, dispersible micronutrient 
supplements (e.g. Sprinkles) cost  $0.88 per child per year, and zinc supplements cost 
$0.16 per child per year plus the cost of accompanying counseling (Levin et al 1994, as 
cited in Horton and Ross 2003; World Bank 2006a; The Micronutrient Initiative 2007 
forthcoming). A general cost figure for a nutrition education program is about $2.50 per 
person per year,
50,51 and the estimated annual cost of community-based growth promotion 
ranges from $1.60 to $10 per child (World Bank 2006a).  
 
Despite these relatively low delivery costs, the cost effectiveness of utilizing a CCT as a 
mechanism to boost the use of these services is uncertain. While there may be potential 
gains from economies of scale by piggybacking the promotion of nutrition services onto 
an existing CCT program (in terms of staff, outreach, training, and logistics) this depends 
on which entity bears the costs of the cash transfers and nutrition interventions and on 
whether there is overlap in the target groups and regions benefiting from each. 
Furthermore, closer linkages between CCTs and nutrition interventions would require 
additional financial, human, physical, and administrative resources, particularly in the 
initial stages of planning and coordination, causing the cost per beneficiary for CCTs 
(estimated at $70-77 annually) to increase (World Bank 2006a). Whether injecting 
resources into a nutrition-oriented CCT would be better spent directly on nutrition 
interventions or on a communication and advocacy campaign to increase awareness, and 
thereby boost demand, remains an open question. 
8.5 Political Support 
One of the fundamental issues affecting the decision to use CCTs and the role that CCTs 
could play in combating undernutrition is political support. The national perception of 
nutrition is likely to influence the potential for CCTs to be leveraged for nutrition 
outcomes. In Peru, where rates of chronic undernutrition are high and government 
support is relatively strong, re-focusing Juntos to be an essential component of the 
national nutrition strategy seemed a natural choice. However, even when political 
backing is currently strong, future support may not be assured, particularly after a change 
in leadership. This was the case in Nicaragua in 2007 when Daniel Ortega’s new 
                                                 
50 Providing multiple age-specific sessions, particularly if there were separate sessions for mothers and 
fathers, while likely increasing the benefit of this component, would also increase the cost as well as 
complicate the logistics of planning, publicizing, and monitoring such events. 
51 The cost of formative research (Trials of Improved Practices or TIPs) includes salaries and per diems, 
transportation, and research company contracts. Costs could be lowered if well-trained local NGO staff 
members carry out TIPs. This was found to be effective in Guatemala, where barely literate indigenous 
staff effectively conducted TIPs (Change Project 2007). 49 
 
administration failed to renew the contracts of all staff associated with RPS and 
considered replacing the CCT with a radically different program—the provision of a cow 
for each poor family in Nicaragua (Flores, personal communication 2007).  
 
In places where undernutrition rates do not cause national alarm or government 
recognition of the problem of undernutrition is minimal, introducing or modifying a CCT 
to focus on curbing undernutrition should be cautiously considered because the 
government may fail to allocate sufficient resources or ensure coordination between the 
CCT program and national health and nutrition policies. Where support for nutrition is 
flagging, donors and NGOs can conduct advocacy campaigns to highlight the importance 
of nutrition and share the experiences of other countries with similar circumstances that 
have made progress in reducing undernutrition, either using the mechanism of CCTs 
effectively as part of their nutrition strategy or by relying on another approach.  
8.6 Institutional Roles and Coordination 
When nutrition services are linked to a CCT, beyond getting the technical details of 
nutrition interventions correct, there are a number of critical institutional questions that 
arise. One key question—which affects CCTs whether they focus on nutrition or not—is, 
which entity is responsible for implementing individual program elements? Although 
institutional arrangements vary by country, typically implementation responsibilities are 
shared across different levels and departments of government (World Bank 2007c). At 
the national level, members of the CCT implementing agency, ministry representatives 
(from the Ministries of Education, Health, Finance, and others in charge of infrastructure, 
women’s and children’s welfare, information systems, etc.), Secretariats (e.g. of strategy 
and coordination), and technical and logistical representatives all play important roles. 
Some CCTs also have municipal and community committees with the participation of 
civil society representatives, school and health care service providers, and local 
volunteers. The involvement of so many parties can introduce territoriality, competition, 
and duplication of efforts.   
 
One approach that some CCTs have taken to reduce the duplication of benefits to poor 
families is to require that beneficiaries stop receiving benefits from other social programs 
(as in Mexico and Nicaragua). An expected benefit of this approach, as specified by the 
Progresa program, is to absorb numerous poverty alleviation programs into a single 
program that represents an integrated approach to poverty alleviation (Skoufias 2005). 
While there are clear benefits to streamlining a country’s social protection efforts and 
ensuring complementarity among programs, putting this degree of coordination into 
practice remains a challenge. Furthermore, there are concerns that focusing exclusively 
on CCT programs “constitute[s] a reduction in the commitment to social justice, one that 
focuses only on the most extreme cases of poverty” (Lomelí 2008). 
 
There is also a risk that line ministries will perceive a CCT planning agency to be 
trespassing on their turf. For example, particularly if targeting approaches differ across 
programs, the Ministry of Health may have determined that clinics or services are needed 
in particular regions, while the CCT requires them in its own program areas. A particular 
problem for nutrition activities results from there being no “institutional home” for 50 
 
nutrition. Therefore, ministries (e.g. health, social services, women and children, or 
others work on issues surrounding nutrition) may not place nutrition-related services 
among their top concerns.  
 
As another example, the Ministry of Health may be unwilling to provide the necessary 
training and supervision of staff and volunteers that make possible CCT conditionalities 
for growth monitoring and promotion (whether community- or facility-based) or 
micronutrient supplementation because these compete with other ministry priorities. Two 
things may be helpful in this situation: first, a CCT planning and implementation 
structure that involves multiple ministries—including those that work in the area of 
nutrition—in strategic planning, and second, incentives to encourage adherence to CCT 
efforts. Ensuring a participatory role in CCT planning for ministry representatives in such 
activities as defining CCT conditionalities and minimum standards for health and 
nutrition services could clarify the interrelated goals of the CCT and ministry projects 
and facilitate coordination regarding the location, duration, and target groups for their 
various interventions. This process could also allow stakeholders to explore possible 
gains from economies of scale and shared resources like communication, training, 
infrastructure, and logistics. Accompanying coordination efforts with carrots (e.g. 
funding for ministry projects that play a key role in CCT implementation, monetary 
incentives for service quality, or public recognition) or sticks (e.g. greater public 
accountability, transparency, and results monitoring) could further incentivize 
collaboration and high-quality program implementation. 
 
9. Conclusions  
The evidence presented in this paper illustrates that the combination of cash and 
conditionalities has allowed some CCTs to appreciably reduce child stunting. However, 
impacts on stunting have not been consistent across programs and reductions in anemia 
have been rare. Several design and implementation modifications could likely increase 
these impacts and allow CCTs to play a more important role in national nutrition policies. 
CCTs are by no means the best tool for solving child undernutrition in all cases, but there 
seems to be real promise for CCTs to promote participation in proven nutrition 
interventions where demand is low and possibly to enhance the supply and quality of 
these interventions where services are poor. The effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
different design options as well as their appropriateness in different contexts, of course, 
must be carefully evaluated. 
 
The following list outlines some general implications of the discussion above. Many of 
these ideas are still new and untested. Much creative experimentation and careful 
research is needed to find the best ways to coordinate effective nutrition strategies that 
capitalize on the strengths of CCTs to break the cycle of poverty and child undernutrition.  
9.1 Facilitating CCT Impacts on Undernutrition 
In countries concerned with child undernutrition that are considering a cash transfer 
program to affect nutrition outcomes, the decision rule mentioned above can help 
determine whether it is appropriate to consider nutrition-related conditionalities. Where 51 
 
nutrition programs exist and are well-used and effective, conditionality is unnecessary 
and an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) is the best option; where nutrition programs 
exist, are of good quality, but are underutilized, nutrition-related conditionalities should 
be considered to spur participation; where nutrition programs exist, are underutilized and 
are of poor quality, a CCT coupled with supply-side improvements should be considered; 
and where no nutrition program exists, a CCT is not appropriate unless high-quality 
services can be introduced and it is determined that these services would be underutilized. 
Questions of political economy, administrative capacity, and cost-effectiveness should 
also be considered. 
 
If conditionality is deemed an option, the following actions could help facilitate increased 
impact on maternal and child undernutrition for CCTs, whether existing or in the 
planning stage, that state the improvement of nutritional status as a specific objective: 
 
•  Undertake formative research to identify reasons for low levels of service 
utilization or participation. Use this information to craft appropriate 
conditionalities. 
 
•  Assess the effectiveness of any existing conditionalities, eliminate those that are 
found to be extraneous or counterproductive—those with minimal or deleterious 
impacts on nutritional outcomes—and replace these with conditionalities that are 
more likely to reduce undernutrition (i.e. conditionalities based on the six 
Essential Nutrition Actions and employing best practices from nutrition 
interventions).  
 
•  Ensure that CCT benefits and nutrition-related conditionalities cover the full 
period of greatest nutritional need, from pregnancy through the first two years of 
life. If it is feasible and there is sufficient need, continue benefits and 
conditionalities (particularly related to micronutrient supplementation and health) 
through the pre-school years.  
 
•  Test new types of conditionalities and new ways of applying them. Experiment 
with conditionalities applied to participation in early childhood development 
services and the use of new micronutrient supplements (e.g. dispersible 
micronutrient preparations accompanied by messages about complementary 
feeding; zinc supplements; and B12 supplements where iron supplements have 
not been effective) and nutritional supplements where protein and energy intake is 
still insufficient. Test appropriate ways to transmit messages about child caring 
and feeding to fathers and other caretakers. Evaluate community-level 
conditionalities to determine whether incentives for reaching specified 
participation targets (e.g. participation in community-based growth promotion, 
immunizations, or institutionalized births) and/or impact targets (e.g. reduced 
stunting rates) can be effective. Find out if free-riders are a serious problem or if 
there is a positive peer pressure effect associated with collective responsibility for 
nutrition results.  
 52 
 
•  Accompany CCT implementation with supply-side enhancements in areas where 
services and/or infrastructure are insufficient to support the increased demand 
associated with a CCT or where quality is poor. Test the use of conditionalities 
and/or incentives for service providers as a means of ensuring high-quality 
services (e.g. weight monitoring, counseling, and delivery of key micronutrients) 
and incentivizing the introduction of less familiar practices (e.g. delayed umbilical 
cord clamping). Postpone CCT introduction until services and infrastructure are 
available or until simultaneous efforts are undertaken to roll out the CCT and 
strengthen the supply and quality of services.  
 
•  Involve ministries (e.g. health, social services, women and children, etc.), the 
agency responsible for the CCT, donors, and other stakeholders engaged in 
nutrition policy and programming in decisions about nutrition-related 
conditionalities and supply-side enhancements. Plan for a coordinated 
implementation effort with guaranteed incentives for each player involved in 
service delivery and oversight. 
 
•  Include nutrition indicators within the list of primary outcome indicators for the 
CCT (e.g. anthropometry, hemoglobin levels, and other biomarkers). Collect data 
on these indicators as part of regular program monitoring and impact evaluation. 
Ensure that evaluation methods are rigorous, prioritizing randomized controlled 
trials, where possible. This will help build the evidence base of CCT impacts on 
undernutrition. 
9.2 Recommended Research 
Additional research could provide empirical evidence to interested countries and agencies 
to help them make rational choices about CCT design appropriate for specific contexts. 
Several types of research are important to inform decisions about using CCTs as 
instruments for nutrition policy. Formative research, conducted during the initial stages 
of design, could identify beneficiary and service provider perspectives and clarify 
obstacles they face and potential sources of motivation. This information could guide 
choices made about CCT design.  
 
Once a CCT is functioning, operational research can help identify how different program 
components are actually being delivered, whether best practices are being adhered to, and 
where bottlenecks arise. This research could lend insight into which CCT design 
elements are working well, which are most encumbered by obstacles, and which 
constraints might be amenable to change. It could also explore whether the introduction 
of new conditionalities and supply-side investments overwhelms CCT program operation 
and whether offering improved services and incentives burdens institutional capacity and 
organization.  
 
Cost-effectiveness studies could identify those nutrition interventions that CCTs can most 
cheaply and effectively utilize as conditionalities and illuminate some of the trade-offs 
associated with applying conditionalities versus using mass communication approaches 
to achieve nutrition-related behavioral change. These studies could also shed light on the 53 
 
comparative advantage of using CCTs to address undernutrition compared to other 
possible areas of focus, such as ECD, risk mitigation, human capital development and/or 
productive activities for adults, or a combination of these.  
 
Additional impact evaluations using both quantitative and qualitative methods are 
needed. Qualitative research could investigate the usefulness and complementarity among 
nutrition inputs from the perspective of beneficiaries, communities, and service 
providers. Of particular interest would be information on perceptions of the accessibility 
of services, quality of counseling, and any behavior change that may be facilitated by 
CCTs focused on nutrition. Randomized studies aimed at disentangling the independent 
impacts of different types of conditionalities and their various combinations; the 
effectiveness of individual versus community level conditionalities, and the benefits 
conferred by supply-side enhancements on nutritional outcomes would be invaluable.  
 
Empirical work on in various country contexts is critical since CCTs are spreading 
widely and rapidly. Comparative studies drawing lessons from experiences in areas 
characterized by diverse nutrition problems and policies, varying levels of government 
capacity and commitment, and different types and quantities of existing resources and 
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To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2006, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. Conditional Cash Transfers programs (CCTs)—which grant cash to poor families
provided they make specified investments in the human capital of their children—
have been championed as an effective intervention for social protection.  Some
CCTs include requirements (called conditionalities) related to health and nutrition.
Yet while there is evidence indicating that some CCTs have improved the nutritional
status of beneficiary children, there has been little commentary on the potential
for CCTs to make a greater contribution to improving nutritional status, nor on the
programmatic and contextual issues affecting their ability to do so.  This paper
finds that where utilization of nutrition interventions is low, there is significant
potential for CCTs to play a greater role in reducing undernutrition by encouraging
groups at high risk of undernutrition to utilize effective nutrition services and by
encouraging improved quality of these services.  Several key design
modifications—e.g. limiting CCT eligibility to the “window of opportunity” for
nutrition impact, prioritizing nutrition-related conditionalities based on best
practices in nutrition, increasing attention to supply-side investments for nutrition
and health services, and improving coordination with other agencies and
stakeholders—could allow CCTs to better contribute to eliminating child
undernutrition in the developing world.  At the same time, there is much to be
learned about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of various design options,
as well as their appropriateness in different country contexts.
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